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 Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and 
Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence 
 
Elizabeth L. MacDowell 
ABSTRACT 
The role of identity-based stereotypes about perpetrators in domestic 
violence cases has not received much attention in legal scholarship, which 
has instead focused on the identities of victims. However, stereotypes 
governing who is a recognizable victim (e.g., that victims are white, middle-
class, passive, and dependent women in heterosexual relationships) cannot 
by themselves explain why nonconforming victims are sometimes successful 
in family court cases and other, more “perfect” victims are not. Drawing on 
intersectionality theory, which studies the ways experiences are shaped by 
the interaction of multiple identity categories, I argue that understanding this 
phenomenon requires a relational analysis that examines the “other side”: 
the perpetrator, recognition of whom is governed by intersecting identity 
stereotypes that parallel those affecting victims. Part II introduces two 
illustrative domestic violence cases and shows the ways in which 
conventional approaches to intersectional analysis of victims’ experiences 
cannot explain why unconventional victims sometimes win their cases while 
others do not. Part III proposes extending intersectionality theory on 
domestic violence with insights from legal scholarship on the 
intersectionality of heterosexual men of color and performance theory in 
order to allow for consideration of how identity is enacted by both victims 
and perpetrators in court. This Part also considers issues of relative privilege 
and subordination that arise from an analysis that includes perpetrators as 
well as victims. Part IV examines the methodological implications of an 
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extended intersectional frame, and shows how a more comparative, 
intercategorical approach to intersectional method supports an analysis that 
is at once more particularized and more expansive in its explanatory power. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence is a serious social problem that is frequently 
unrecognized, minimized, or ignored because of stereotypes about who is at 
risk and from whom.1 The stereotype against which victims2 are judged is 
 
 1.  In the United States, approximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are physically 
assaulted by an intimate partner each year. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iv (2000), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/183781.htm. Intimate partners committed 
fourteen percent of all homicides in the United States in 2007, killing an estimated 1640 women and 
700 men. SHANNON M. CATALANO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEMALE VICTIMS OF 
VIOLENCE 2 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2020. For a 
compilation of statistics regarding incidents of domestic violence by race/ethnicity, gender, and 
sexuality, and impacts on employment, children, and other issues, see Am. Bar Ass’n. Comm’n on 
Domestic & Sexual Violence, Domestic Violence Statistics: Survey of Recent Statistics, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/domestic_violence/resources/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2013).  
There is no uniform or agreed upon terminology for discussing violence between intimates. I use the 
terms domestic violence, intimate partner violence, and relationship violence in this Article 
interchangeably to refer to violence between intimate partners, unless a more specific meaning is 
indicated or appears in quoted text. 
 2.  I use the term “victim” recognizing that victims have agency and often resist violence, and 
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that of the perfect victim: a fictive construct that floats ghost-like between 
historical, social, and subjective reality, and is generally identified as 
passive, dependent, white, middle-class, heterosexual, and female.3 The 
exclusion of victims who are perceived as not conforming to the perfect 
victim stereotype from needed services or legal protection—including 
victims of color, victims in same-sex relationships or who are transgender, 
and victims who fight back—is well-documented.4 However, not all victims 
who are unlike the perfect victim are excluded from services or otherwise 
unsuccessful when they seek help. I argue that understanding this 
phenomenon requires examining not only victims but also what I refer to as 
the “perceivable perpetrator,” recognition of whom is also shaped by 
stereotypes about race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and gender.5 
In reaching these conclusions, I draw on intersectionality—a method for 
examining the interaction of identity categories and the theory of what 
happens when multiple subordinating categories intersect.6 Intersectionality 
theory posits that the interaction of categories creates unique identities and 
experiences for individuals who are subject to multiple forms of 
subordination, such as women of color.7 Recent scholarship shows that 
consideration of the sexualization of race and the role of identity 
performance in race and gender stereotyping warrants extending 
intersectionality theory to heterosexual men of color, who are typically 
 
that many activists and scholars prefer the term “survivors” in recognition of these attributes. My use 
of the term is intended include the breadth of individuals subjected to domestic violence, including 
those who do not survive. 
 3.  See infra Part II.B (detailing the origins and attributes of the perfect victim stereotype). 
 4.  See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Queer Lockdown: Coming to Terms with the Ongoing 
Criminalization of LGBTQ Communities, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE, Summer 2009, at 1, 4, 
available at http://sfonline.barnard.edu/sexecon/cammett_04.htm (describing how gender 
stereotypes result in criminalization of queer victims); Leigh Goodmark, Transgender Abuse 33 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the exclusion of transgender victims from 
anti-domestic violence services due to lack of conformity with gender stereotypes); Leigh 
Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 96–113 (2008) [hereinafter Goodmark, When She Fights Back] (detailing 
impact of stereotypes on African American and lesbian victims); Adele M. Morrison, Changing the 
Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1061 (2006) [hereinafter Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course] (describing a 
domestic violence discourse that defines who is and is not viewed as a victim). 
 5.  See infra Part III.A (discussing stereotypes related to perpetrators). 
 6.  See infra Part II.B (describing intersectionality theory); infra Part IV (describing 
intersectional method). 
 7.  See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex] 
(describing how single-axis theories of discrimination fail to capture the multi-dimensional 
experiences of black women).  
534 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] 
characterized as singly subordinated.8 This scholarship shows that identities 
associated with privilege can be sources of subordination depending on 
context and intervening norms and stereotypes.9 Using case studies of two 
domestic violence cases with outcomes that are unanticipated and 
unexplained by conventional approaches as examples, I argue that the 
intersectional frame as applied to domestic violence should be extended to 
include an analysis of the performed intersectional identities of both victims 
and perpetrators. 
Examining the intersectional identity of perpetrators is an intervention 
with far-reaching implications. Although the racial, ethnic, and gender 
construction of perpetrators has been explored in legal scholarship,10 
scholarship on domestic violence does not usually factor the identity of 
perpetrators into the analysis of case outcomes.11 Nor do scholars typically 
compare the experiences of victims who are unlike the perfect victim 
stereotype or consider why their experiences in the legal system differ from 
one another; the identities of white victims also remain unexamined with 
any specificity.12 By extending the intersectional frame to include 
perpetrators, this Article contributes to understandings of how identity 
shapes responses to domestic violence in ways that cannot be addressed by 
focusing on victims alone. Ultimately, this requires rethinking the ways in 
 
 8.  See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, 
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853 (2006) [hereinafter 
Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity] (laying out the basis for extending intersectionality 
theory to heterosexual black men); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination 
Against African-American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex 
Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 26 (1996) (making an earlier iteration of this argument in 
the employment discrimination context). See also Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-
Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. 
L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010) [hereinafter Cooper, Masculinities] (discussing the importance of analyzing 
masculinity in a “multidimensional way that acknowledges that gender and race (as well as class and 
other identities) operate simultaneously, inextricably, and in a context-dependent manner”). 
 9.  See Cooper, Masculinities, supra note 8 (explaining that heterosexual black men who fail 
to comply with assimilationist racial norms are being stereotyped as criminal, animalistic, and 
hypersexual). See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” 
“Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 285, 312 (2001) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Identity Crisis] (discussing the ways in which 
“heterosexual status, typically a privileged category, has served as a source of racial subjugation” 
and describing lynching as an example of “racist, sexualized rhetoric that constructed black males as 
heterosexual threats to white women”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 876–79 (discussing 
the construction of the “Bad Black Man”); Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: 
Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20–21 (1998) 
(describing a “lynch mob ideology” that constructs black men as perpetrators); Abbe Smith, The 
“Monster” in All of Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367, 387–91 
(2005) (describing the gendered dimensions of responses to Aileen Wuornos).  
 11.  See infra Part IV (describing how traditional intersectional method tends to limit 
categorical complexity). 
 12.  See supra note 11. 
 Theorizing from Particularity 535 
which the interrelationships of identity categories are construed in domestic 
violence theory and practice, including the identities of white women who 
are victims.13 In turn, it requires an extension of intersectional method and 
analysis that shifts the locus of the inquiry from the intersection of 
subordinating social categories to the interstices—the spaces in between 
converging categories of power.14 This shift will permit the analysis of 
relative privilege and subordination that adding the perpetrator to 
intersectional analysis requires. It will also create a space more conducive to 
drawing connections across categories of difference and incorporating the 
analysis of power more directly into intersectional analysis.15 
While expanding the analysis to include the intersectional identities of 
all parties in a domestic violence case may raise normative concerns, 
acknowledging the role of the perceivable perpetrator in case outcomes is 
not about excusing violence or other abuse.16 Not attending to the 
connections between victims and perpetrators allows racist, ethnocentric, 
and heterosexist stereotypes underlying both the perfect victim and the 
perceivable perpetrator to flourish. In contrast, addressing these connections 
holds the potential to advance anti-domestic violence work and further the 
purpose of intersectional inquiry, which is to describe and resist 
subordination.17 Thus, my proposal offers a nonexclusive strategy for 
extending the intersectional frame in order to accommodate a more nuanced 
analysis in a field characterized by dynamic and changing understandings 
and contexts, which will benefit from multiple interventions and 
methodologies. 
Part II of this Article presents the cases of Sandra and Jerome and 
Madeline and Steve: two couples of color who appear in front of the same 
family court judge but whose cases result in apparently inconsistent 
 
 13.  See infra Part III (arguing that individual identity should be distinguished from 
stereotypes like the perfect victim); infra Part IV (discussing approaches to studying the intersection 
of identity categories). 
 14.  See infra Part IV (discussing shifts in the analytical structure of intersectional theory 
about domestic violence required for a more relational analysis that includes perpetrators).  
 15.  See supra note 14.  
 16.  See infra Part III (describing why analysis of relative subordination should not be 
confused with relativity). 
 17.  See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 701, 707 (2001) [hereinafter The Fifth Black Woman] (describing the aim of intersectionality 
as not only making certain identities visible, but centering them in law and politics); Natalie J. 
Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender: 
Challenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence Against Marginalized Women in Diverse 
Communities, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38, 39 (2005) (describing the latter as two distinct 
objectives of intersectional domestic violence scholarship). See also Rita Kaur Dhamoon, 
Considerations on Mainstreaming Intersectionality, 64 POL. RES. Q. 230, 234 (2011) (“This 
attention to power, as the subject of struggle and the subject of transformation, gives an 
intersectional-type research paradigm its critical edge.”). 
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outcomes. This Part shows how the apparent inconsistency in their case 
outcomes is unexplained by routine failures of the family court system to 
protect victims or by single-axis accounts of race and gender. This Part also 
presents intersectionality theory and the history and function of the perfect 
victim stereotype in greater detail. Additionally, Part II discusses the impact 
of intersecting racial and gender stereotypes on women of color like Sandra 
and Madeline. This Part shows that, although intersectionality theory is more 
powerful than single-axis theories, a traditional intersectional approach also 
fails to account for the difference in their case outcomes. 
Part III details the intersectional stereotypes that apply to men of color, 
like Jerome and Steve, and render them vulnerable to being perceived as 
perpetrators of crime. This Part also introduces the concept of identity 
performance to show why—despite the pervasive power of stereotypes—
experiences of subordination are not identical even under similar 
circumstances. Using an expanded analytical framework, this Part shows 
these case outcomes can only be reconciled when the performed identities of 
all parties are considered in relation to one another. Additionally, Part III 
discusses the implications of situational and relative privilege that surface in 
the analysis, and the need to account for relative privilege within an 
expanded intersectional frame that includes perpetrators as well as victims. 
Part III shows the importance of distinguishing between situational and 
structural privilege, and between the identities of individuals and stereotypes 
such as the perfect victim. In particular, it shows that deconstructing the 
relational qualities of intersectional identity requires a more complete 
analysis of white identity, and argues that white women bringing domestic 
violence claims should be analyzed with specificity in relation to the 
perpetrator and not conflated with the perfect victim trope. 
Finally, Part IV considers the preceding suggestions for expanding the 
intersectional framework in terms of methodology. This Part shows that 
considering the identity of perpetrators in case outcomes moves 
intersectional method from an intracategorical approach (which provides a 
detailed account of individuals located along single dimensions of 
intersecting social categories—i.e., black women) towards an 
intercategorical approach (which provides a detailed and comparative 
account of individuals located along multiple dimensions of intersecting 
social categories—i.e., black and white women and men). While 
intersectional theorists typically juxtapose the primary social group being 
studied against another (typically more socially-advantaged) group or 
category (like victims who are white, middle-class, heterosexual women), 
other groups are seldom examined in detail. This Part shows that the 
introduction of even a modest, yet more complete, intercategorical element 
like that suggested here—examining both dimensions of the victim–
perpetrator dyad in detail—significantly increases intersectionality’s 
explanatory power. However, Part IV also shows how tendencies in the 
analytical structure of theory about domestic violence create challenges for 
applying intercategorical methods. This Part analyzes the relationship 
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between more particular and more general understandings of subordination 
in the context of domestic violence and argues that a more particular 
approach—one combining intra and intercategorical methods—is 
nonetheless possible and supports a stronger understanding of the general 
operation of subordinating social structures. Finally, Part IV discusses 
implications of a more particularized analysis for practice. 
II.  THE LIMITS OF AN INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
THAT FOCUSES SOLELY ON THE VICTIM 
A.  Two Cases, One Courtroom 
Sandra18 is an African American woman in her mid-twenties who on 
several occasions fought back when her ex-boyfriend Jerome, also African 
American and about the same age, beat her—a fact documented in police 
reports when Sandra was arrested as the perpetrator, including during an 
incident in which she was charged with resisting arrest. On these occasions, 
either a neighbor or Jerome called the police; Sandra never called the police 
in response to Jerome’s violence against her, which she estimated occurred 
at least once a month over the five years they were together. On one of the 
occasions in which Sandra was arrested, the police report states she was 
injured and bleeding. However, while Jerome spoke to the police at the 
scene, Sandra refused to tell them her side of the story.19 Sandra only sought 
legal protection from Jerome after they had broken up and he was arrested 
for assaulting and injuring her outside a shopping mall—an incident that 
resulted in his conviction for domestic violence.20 Despite the potentially 
significant barrier to relief presented by her own arrest record,21 when 
Sandra subsequently went to family court, she was successful in obtaining a 
civil restraining order against Jerome that protected her and the son she had 
with Jerome, as well as orders for sole physical and legal custody, and an 
order that Jerome’s visitation would be professionally monitored. At the 
time of the family court hearing, Sandra was a clerk in a professional office 
and Jerome was unemployed. She testified that he had sold marijuana to earn 
a living during their relationship, while she always held a legitimate job. 
Madeline is an American-born Mexican American whose case against 
 
 18.  The stories in this Article are drawn from the experiences of my clients. Names and other 
details have been changed in order to protect their privacy.  
 19.  Sandra testified that she believed Jerome would retaliate if she talked to the police.  
 20.  Jerome pled “not guilty” to intentional infliction of corporal injury, an offense that may be 
charged as a misdemeanor or felony, and was convicted of simple domestic battery following trial. 
 21.  Women who use force against an abusive intimate partner lose credibility as victims with 
judges, juries, and attorneys. See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 94–95 
(describing how “[o]nce a battered woman uses violence, her status as ‘victim’ is imperiled”). 
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her mixed race (Latino/white)22 husband Steve appeared some months later 
in front of the same family court judge. Madeline and Steve were in their 
early twenties and had been together since their teens. Like Sandra, 
Madeline supported the family in a semi-professional office job, while Steve 
was chronically unemployed throughout their relationship. Evidence was 
presented in family court showing that Steve had been fired from jobs for 
stealing from his employers, and he was unemployed at the time of the trial. 
Also like Sandra, Madeline had never called the police about Steve’s abuse, 
which she reported had been ongoing during their seven-year relationship, 
and only sought help after an incident of post-separation violence that 
occurred in a public place and resulted in Steve’s arrest and conviction for 
domestic violence.23 Additionally, there was evidence that Madeline 
suffered physical injuries from the most recent episode of domestic violence, 
as well as in past incidents of abuse. Police reports also documented that she 
did not cooperate with police on one occasion, refusing to answer questions 
during a domestic violence call initiated by a neighbor. However, instead of 
Madeline’s arrest, this incident resulted in her being transported to the 
emergency room and put on a psychiatric hold after Steve claimed that she 
had attempted suicide. Unlike Sandra, Madeline had never been arrested or 
charged with domestic violence. 
But although Sandra and Madeline sought the same orders from the 
same judge, the results of their family court cases were different. While the 
judge granted Madeline a protective order and an order for custody of the 
couple’s two children, he impatiently rejected her requests that Steve’s 
visitation of the children be supervised. Instead, he minimized her safety 
concerns regarding the children, and granted Steve extended periods of 
contact, including overnight visits. In stark contrast to Sandra’s case, the 
judge treated Madeline and Steve as mutually blameworthy and ordered both 
parties, to attend parenting classes. As Madeline described to me regarding 
her family court experience after the trial, “There was no question that I was 
beat [by my husband]. The judge knew I was beat and didn’t care. I was less 
than zero.”24 
This difference in outcomes is not explained by the facts of these cases. 
In each case, the perpetrator’s criminal court conviction would constitute a 
 
 22.  I use the terms Latina and Latino throughout this Article to refer to individuals of Latin 
American, Caribbean, and mixed ethnic origin or ancestry. In addition, because Latinas/os are multi-
racial and multi-ethnic, I use the term race/ethnicity to discuss issues related to discrimination 
against Latinos, and when discussing people of color, including Latinos, rather than trying to 
distinguish between discrimination based on racism and ethnocentrism. See Katherine Culliton-
González, Time to Revive Puerto Rican Voting Rights, 19 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 27, 46–47 n.150 
(2008) (discussing the basis for this approach given the intersection of race and ethnicity in 
discrimination against Latinos).  
 23.  Steve pled guilty to the same charge Jerome was convicted of—simple domestic battery—
after the prosecutor reduced the charge in a plea deal. 
 24.  See supra note 18. 
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finding that domestic violence occurred, establishing a basis for issuance of 
civil restraining orders25 and a rebuttable presumption in the victim’s favor 
for child custody.26 Moreover, many of the commonalities in these cases are 
significant indictors of future lethality.27 But that did not make issuance of 
the requested orders a sure thing in either case. Studies have shown that 
judges are reluctant to deny custody even to adjudicated batterers.28 While 
the existence of a statutory presumption that batterers are unfit for custody 
makes it more likely that judges will award sole custody to the victim rather 
than the perpetrator, research shows that high percentages of adjudicated 
batterers are still awarded custody in states with such a presumption.29 That 
Sandra obtained an order for supervised visitation is especially remarkable. 
 
 25.  All fifty states have statutes authorizing issuance of civil orders of protection for domestic 
abuse based on physical violence and other criminal acts. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, 
Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 
1131–32 (2009). Two-thirds of the states limit protection to those cases. Id. at 1112. 
 26.  Twenty-five states have statutory presumptions that an adjudicated perpetrator of 
domestic violence shall not be awarded custody of minor children. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT A PERPETRATOR OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHALL NOT HAVE SOLE CUSTODY, JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY, OR JOINT 
PHYSICAL CUSTODY (Jan. 1, 2009) (on file with author) (compiling state statutes). Sandra and 
Madeline’s cases were tried in a state with such a presumption.  
 27.  See Neil Websdale & Bahney Dedolph, Nat’l Res. Ctr. On Domestic Violence, Lethality 
Assessment Tools: A Critical Analysis, VAWNET.ORG, http://www.vawnet.org/research/print-
document.php?doc_id=387&find_type=web_desc_AR (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (describing 
lethality research). In particular, nearly every study of lethality in domestic violence cases finds an 
association between femicide (murder of women by a male partner) and separation or estrangement; 
risk of nonlethal physical and sexual abuse of both female victims and children increases after 
separation as well. Id. A history of physical violence resulting in injury to the victim is also a sign of 
heightened risk of lethality in domestic violence cases. Id. Risk of a lethal attack also increases if the 
abuser commits a public act of violence or otherwise puts himself at heightened risk of negative 
consequences. Hallie Bongar White & James G. White, Testifying About Lethality Risk Factors, 
VAWOR (2005), https://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/lethalitytribal/lethalitytribal.html. When in 
combination with other lethality factors, unemployment is an increased risk factor as well. Id.  
 28.  See, e.g., LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT 113 
(2002) (reporting that perpetrators of domestic violence are as likely to prevail in their efforts to 
obtain custody of their children as non-perpetrators). 
 29.  See Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the Father Has 
Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076, 1101 (2005) 
(reporting that in states with a statutory presumption against awarding custody to batterers, forty 
percent of fathers adjudicated as having committed domestic violence against the mother were still 
awarded joint custody). Victims seeking custody in states with competing statutory provisions 
regarding custody (e.g., a presumption in favor of joint custody and favoring the parent perceived by 
the court as more open to shared parenting), as was the case in Sandra and Madeline’s state, fared 
even worse: sole custody was awarded to battering fathers in those states more often than to the 
mothers who were their victims. Id. Mothers also received sole physical custody less frequently 
when the father was an adjudicated batterer in states with such statutory presumptions (sixty-four 
percent of the time) than in states with no statutory presumption (sixty-seven percent of the time); if 
there were competing presumptions, mothers generally received “primary” physical custody, which 
is tantamount to shared custody (eighty-two percent of the time). Id. at 1093, 1102. 
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Judges are reluctant to restrict visitation for batterers,30 and may in fact be 
less likely to impose restrictions on visitation when there is evidence of 
domestic violence against the custodial parent by the noncustodial parent.31 
Poor outcomes for victims have been attributed to the delegalized culture of 
family courts, wherein issues such as child custody are viewed as emotional 
rather than legal problems;32 the vagueness of applicable custody 
standards;33 and a general reluctance on the part of judges to believe battered 
women, or to rule against men who batter them, on custody issues.34 But 
none of these theories explain why these cases had different outcomes. 
Traditional theories of race and gender discrimination that examine 
differing outcomes along a single axis of subordination (e.g., race or gender) 
fail to explain the difference as well. In Madeline’s case, it might be argued 
that the judge—who was a white man—denied her request for supervised 
visitation because he perceived Steve, a biracial man, as (more) white and 
favored him for that reason.35 But white supremacy/racism alone would not 
 
 30. Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody Determinations Among 
Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991, 1014–15 
(2005) (reporting that less than seventeen percent of fathers in cases surveyed where the court was 
aware of substantiated domestic violence were denied any child visitation; supervised visitation “was 
no more likely” to be ordered for the abusive parent in cases involving domestic violence than in 
other cases); Morrill et al., supra note 29, at 1102 (reporting that although bench officers in states 
with a presumption against awarding custody to adjudicated batterers imposed some conditions on 
visitation more often than in states without such a presumption, “at best, only 64% of orders in these 
states imposed [any] structure or conditions on visitation orders”). 
 31.  See Nancy E. Johnson et al., Child Custody Mediation in Cases of Domestic Violence: 
Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1022, 1046–48 (2005) 
(reporting evidence that judges received recommendations from mediators for joint child custody 
arrangements more often in cases involving allegations of domestic violence than in cases that did 
not involve such allegations; supervised child visitation was recommended in a higher percentage of 
cases where there were no indicators of domestic violence than in cases where there was 
substantiated abuse; the lowest rate of recommendations for supervised visitation occurred in cases 
with victim-acknowledged domestic violence that was not reported to the court by the mediator).  
 32.  See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts 
and Court Pluralism, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 107–08, 121 n.110 (2011) [hereinafter 
MacDowell, When Courts Collide] (discussing how victims’ access to civil court remedies for 
domestic violence is constrained by court culture); see also Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, 
Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
727, 731–33 (1988) (describing mediators and social workers as supplanting legal actors in the 
family courts). 
 33.  See Fineman, supra note 32, at 770 (arguing the best interest of the child standard for 
determining parental custody must be replaced with a standard that is more determinate and less 
susceptible to moral rather than legal judgments). 
 34.  See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: 
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 657, 675 (2003) (describing the belief of judges in domestic violence cases that it is unfair to 
consider the perpetrator’s violence against the other parent when addressing child custody issues).  
 35.  Studies show trial judges are subject to implicit racial bias in ways similar to the general 
public. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial 
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (reporting the results of an empirical study showing 
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explain why he did not also react negatively to a mixed-race relationship and 
scrutinize the case more closely for that reason, for example by punishing 
Steve more severely than Jerome because he viewed him as a race traitor.36 
Similarly, if white supremacy/racism alone explained the different 
outcomes, the judge might also have reacted negatively to Sandra because 
she was African American, perhaps by ordering her to attend parenting 
classes. 
More complex theories like intersectionality—which examines the 
multidimensional and interactive character of race and gender norms and 
stereotypes in domestic violence cases—provide a better framework for 
understanding the possible dynamics involved in these cases.37 For example, 
considering race and gender highlights the fact that, historically, white men 
have not been punished for engaging in intimate relationships with, or 
violence against, women of color.38 Therefore, if the judge had viewed Steve 
as white, he might have given him a “pass” for abusing his Latina wife.39 
However, as typically conceived, intersectional theory about domestic 
violence also fails to explain why the judge responded differently to Steve’s 
violence against Madeline than to Jerome’s violence against Sandra, because 
it focuses on the identity of the victim and not the perpetrator and does not 
examine the relationship between the identities of the parties in each case. 
B.  Intersectionality and the Perfect Victim 
Intersectionality is the primary framework used by feminist scholars to 
analyze the significance of co-occurring identities to the issue of domestic 
violence.40 Kimberlé Crenshaw, who originally applied intersectionality to 
 
the impacts of implicit racial bias on judicial decision-making). Thus, white judges are much more 
likely to draw negative inferences from minority racial status—or favor white status—than are 
judges of color. Id. at 1210–11 (comparing the responses of white and black judges to cues involving 
white and black racial status). However judges who are racial minorities may draw negative 
inferences as well. Id. at 1210. 
 36.  See Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 
1257, 1261 (1997) (making a similar point about police responses to what they perceived as an 
interracial (white/Asian) male couple). See also infra Part III (discussing “putative whiteness” and 
racial differentiation among whites by other whites).  
 37.  I share the view expressed by Frank Rudy Cooper that the various theories of 
“multidimensionality” are consistent with, and a natural extension of, intersectionality theory, and do 
not distinguish between them. See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 862–
63 n.33.  
 38.  See Fenton, supra note 10, at 20 (noting that white male prerogative includes access to 
women of color as well as white women). 
 39.  See infra Part III (distinguishing Jerome’s experience from Steve’s in the event that Steve 
was perceived as white). 
 40.  See, e.g., Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1065 n.6 (providing 
examples of scholars using an intersectional analysis to study the problem of domestic violence). On 
the institutionalization of intersectionality as a mode of analysis in the academy more generally, see 
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analyze experiences of black women in employment discrimination cases, 
introduced the term into legal scholarship.41 Using the analogy of traffic at a 
four-way intersection, Crenshaw argued that the existence of more than one 
subordinate identity creates distinct vulnerabilities to further 
disempowerment that cannot be accurately captured or addressed by 
analyzing a single axis of subordination alone: “If an accident happens in an 
intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of 
directions and, sometimes, from all of them.”42 Thus, she reasoned, while a 
black woman may be harmed by practices that are sexist or racist, she may 
also be uniquely harmed by practices that harm neither men of color nor 
white women.43 Crenshaw subsequently extended intersectional analysis to 
other women of color and to the intersection of gender and other categories 
of identity.44 She defined structural intersectionality as “the ways in which 
the location of women of color at the intersection of race and gender makes 
[their] actual experience . . . qualitatively different than that of white 
women.”45 
Using intersectionality, feminist scholar–activists have shown the ways 
in which women of color victimized by intimate partner violence are 
disadvantaged by what Adele Morrison characterizes as a racialized 
domestic violence legal discourse.46 Morrison describes three interrelated 
parts to the domestic violence discourse: the battered woman identity (that 
battered women must adopt in order to access services and remedies for 
 
Jennifer C. Nash, ‘Home Truths’ on Intersectionality, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 445, 446–47 
(2011). See also Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS 1771, 1771 (2005) 
(characterizing intersectionality as “the most important theoretical contribution that women’s 
studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so far”).  
 41.  See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 7. 
 42.  Id. at 149.  
 43.  See id. (explaining, as a result, “Black women sometimes experience discrimination in 
ways similar to white women’s experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with 
Black men. Yet often they experience double-discrimination—the combined effects of practices 
which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience 
discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black 
women.”).  
 44.  See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1246–50 (1991) [hereinafter 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins] (examining intersections of race, gender, and immigration status 
in relation to domestic violence laws, services and policies). Crenshaw also encouraged extension of 
intersectionality to additional identity categories, including class and sexual orientation. Id. at 1244–
45 n.9. For a history of the concept of intersectionality in black feminist thought, see Nash, supra 
note 40. See also PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, 
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 17–18 (2000) (discussing the development, 
after 1980, of works by black women scholar–activists exploring the interconnectedness of 
oppressions). 
 45.  Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1245.  
 46.  Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1068. 
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abuse);47 the empowerment continuum (the process by which a battered 
woman ends the abuse, including through taking on the battered woman 
identity and engaging the legal system);48 and legal practice (consisting of 
legal structures, substantive law, and procedural processes, each of which 
require successful performance of the battered woman identity).49 The 
problem for women of color, as Morrison explains, is that the battered 
woman identity that threads through each element of domestic violence 
discourse is typically perceived as white.50 More specifically, she is the 
perfect victim described previously—a white, middle-class, heterosexual 
woman who is passive and dependent.51 She does not fight back.52 Other 
than the need for protection, she lacks special needs of any kind.53 
The origins of the perfect victim in domestic violence legal discourse 
lie in the confluence of three factors: social science theories about domestic 
violence that attribute passivity and helplessness to victims;54 political 
decisions by the feminist and battered women’s movements to emphasize 
the universality of battered women’s experiences based on gender rather 
than other structural factors contributing to women’s vulnerability to 
violence, like race and class;55 and deeply-entrenched gender norms that are 
 
 47.  Id. at 1078–86. See also Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 81–82 
(explaining victims must successfully access a preexisting stock narrative about domestic violence in 
order to get help).  
 48.  Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1086–91 (describing how the 
domestic violence discourse became more restrictive as anti-domestic violence services became 
more professionalized and bureaucratic). 
 49.  Id. at 1091–97 (detailing the ways in which legal categories are exclusive in character). 
 50.  Id. at 1077. 
 51.  See id. at 1078 (describing these as the qualities of the “essential battered woman”). 
 52.  See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 83–85 (describing the passivity of 
the paradigmatic victim). 
 53.  See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES 133 (1999) (describing the “ideal victim profile” as “a white woman who speaks English 
and has no material needs or who has the means to hire an attorney to seek financial support through 
the . . . court”).  
 54.  See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 82–85 (describing the influence of 
psychologist Lenore Walker’s theory of learned helplessness on the perception of victims of 
domestic violence as passive). See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: 
Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 
passim (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, Particularity and Generality] (discussing the unintended 
consequences of psychological theories like learned helplessness on perceptions of battered women).  
 55.  See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1258–61 (discussing the use of 
universalized gender narratives to raise awareness of domestic violence in the white community that 
disregard the significance of race and poverty to violence in the lives of women of color). See also 
Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 86 (detailing how “[t]he battered women's 
movement has long struggled with issues of race”).  
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also associated with white womanhood.56 By failing to challenge the racist 
and sexist norms and stereotypes underlying the characterization of victims, 
the first two factors allowed the third to thrive.57 Historically persistent 
stereotypes of white women are that they are passive, fragile, and peaceful.58 
They are also idealized as “the ideal housewife, and the symbol of love and 
motherhood.”59 As Zanita Fenton describes, these are also the qualities of 
the “good girl” who deserves protection: “[o]nly ‘good girls,’ who are 
expected to be chaste and truthful, can be victims.”60 
In contrast, women of color are subject to stereotypes that are directly 
contrary to the perfect victim based on their race/ethnicity alone. Black 
women, for example, are viewed as tough, strong, and psychologically 
dominant,61 as well as sly and untrustworthy.62 Latinas can be stereotyped as 
hot-blooded and temperamental.63 Although other stereotypes of Latinas are 
more consistent with the perfect victim, including portrayals of Latinas as 
virginal and innocent,64 Latinas may also be viewed as accepting of 
patriarchal family structures and violence in their relationships with men, 
 
 56.  See Fenton, supra note 10, at 21 (describing gender and racial norms about womanhood). 
 57.  See Beth E. Richie, A Black Feminist Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND CULTURE 50, 
52–53 (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt eds., 2005) (arguing a universalized gender approach to 
domestic violence led to the erasure of women of color and low income women from the dominant 
view of the problem). 
 58.  Fenton, supra note 10, at 21 (citing Mae C. King, The Politics of Sexual Stereotypes, 4 
BLACK SCHOLAR 12, 15 (1973)).  
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 22.  
 61.  Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonna, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: 
The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1032–
33 (1995).  
 62.  Wendy Brown-Scott, Anita Hill Meets Godzilla: Confessions of a Horror Movie Fan, 70 
TUL. L. REV. 1921, 1932 (1996) (citing GLASS CEILING COMM’N, DEP’T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR 
BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995)). While these attributes 
predominate, the repertoire of stereotypes associated with black women is complex. See Ammons, 
supra note 61, at 1013 n.44 (detailing stereotypes historically applied to black women). None 
however are consistent with the perfect victim. See COLLINS, supra note 44, at 5 (arguing, “[f]rom 
the mammies, jezebels, and breeder women of slavery to the smiling Aunt Jemimas on pancake mix 
boxes, ubiquitous Black prostitutes, and ever-present welfare mothers of contemporary popular 
culture, negative stereotypes applied to African American women have been fundamental to Black 
women’s oppression”). 
 63.  Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1082–83; Jenny Rivera, 
Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and 
Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 240–41 (1994); Women: Barriers to Living 
Violence Free, ACT, http://www.actabuse.com/latinas.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2013). 
 64.  Rivera, supra note 63, at 240 n.51 (describing how these stereotypes were memorialized 
as cultural archetypes in the characters of innocent, sweet, and virginal Maria, and sexy, loud, and 
promiscuous Anita in West Side Story). 
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and therefore undeserving of protection.65 In each case, women of color face 
the additional hurdle of overcoming negative stereotypes in order to 
establish themselves as meeting the criteria of another stereotype: that of the 
perfect victim. 
As Morrison points out, those excluded from the domestic violence 
discourse by virtue of the perfect victim trope include more than 
heterosexual women of color.66 In fact, most victims do not meet the perfect 
victim criteria. Moreover, as reflected in the family court statistics discussed 
above, the domestic violence discourse does not necessarily work well for 
anyone, including white women.67 Rather, the qualities associated with the 
perfect victim are those qualities associated with white women at the level of 
stereotype—assumptions and responses that operate on a subconscious 
level.68 
Madeline and Sandra’s stories demonstrate many of the ways in which 
victims may operate both inside and outside of the perfect victim trope. 
Although they are both women abused by male partners in heterosexual 
relationships, Sandra and Madeline show that women sometimes fight back 
against abusers rather than remaining passive,69 do not necessarily cooperate 
 
 65.  Id. at 240–41. Similar stereotypes exist about Asian women. See Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-
Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 96 (1999) (discussing how the sexualization of Asian American 
women is used to legitimize their subordination by private and legal actors).  
 66.  Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1081–82 (noting that the legal 
system does not work well for immigrants, poor, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender victims of 
domestic violence). 
 67.  But see infra Part IV (discussing the problem with the lack of demographic data tracking 
race/ethnicity in family court cases). 
 68.  See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 
1998) (“Fifty years of research reveals how rooted stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are . . 
. [and how they] operate outside conscious awareness.”).  
 69.  Numerous studies show most women who use physical force against men in heterosexual 
relationships are victims of ongoing battering and are acting in self-defense or to otherwise resist or 
stop the violence against them. In one such study, sociologist Susan Miller found that thirty percent 
of women in court-ordered batterer treatment following arrest on domestic violence charges had 
acted in response to a male partner’s violence. SUSAN L. MILLER, VICTIMS AS OFFENDERS: THE 
PARADOX OF WOMEN’S VIOLENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS 116–20 (2005). See also Megan H. Bair-
Merritt et al., Why Do Women Use Intimate Partner Violence? A Systematic Review of Women’s 
Motivations, 11 TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE 178, 178–89 (2010) (reviewing studies regarding 
women’s motivations for the use of physical violence against intimate partners in heterosexual 
relationships); Shamita Das Dasgupta, Just Like Men? A Critical View of Violence by Women, in 
COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM DULUTH AND 
BEYOND 195, 202 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen L. Pence eds., 1999) (summarizing the results of 
interviews with women who had used violence against male partners); Shamita Das Dasgupta, A 
Framework for Understanding Women’s Use of Nonlethal Violence in Intimate Heterosexual 
Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1364, 1364–89 (2002) (summarizing research findings 
on women who use nonlethal violence against male partners); L. Kevin Hamberger & Clare E. Guse, 
Men’s and Women’s Use of Intimate Partner Violence in Clinical Samples, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
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with police,70 and may stay with men on whom they do not appear 
economically dependent.71 However, their experiences are not fully 
anticipated by an intersectional analysis either. Sandra was successful 
although she was neither white, nor dependent, and fought back. In contrast, 
Madeline was arguably more consistent with the perfect victim trope in that 
she did not use violence to resist Steve’s abuse and thus appeared more 
passive, but she was less successful than Sandra despite these qualities. 
These experiences show that the perfect victim trope and the need for 
victims to adhere to its criteria is only half the story. The judge in family 
court did not evaluate Sandra and Madeline’s identities as victims in 
isolation. Rather, both appeared in court opposite their former partners, 
whom the judge had to see as perpetrators in order for Sandra and Madeline 
to get the relief they sought. Therefore, understanding the different outcomes 
in these cases requires examining the identities of each of the parties. The 
judge may have viewed Jerome and Steve’s racial identities as men of color 
much differently than Sandra and Madeline’s racial identities as women.72 In 
other words, their intersectionality could be as much a part of the story as 
Sandra and Madeline’s. In fact, these stories suggest that the existence of a 
perceptible perpetrator may be, at least in some instances, determinative of 
whether or not a victim gets relief. 
III.  EXTENDING THE INTERSECTIONAL FRAME 
A.  The Perceptible Perpetrator 
A victim requires a perpetrator, an identity that is constructed in 
 
WOMEN 1301, 1301–31 (2002) (comparing the experiences of women who had been court-ordered 
to attend abuse abatement counseling and women in a domestic violence shelter); Susan L. Miller & 
Michelle L. Meloy, Women’s Use of Force: Voices of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence, 12 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 89, 89–115 (2006) (examining data collected from observations at 
three female domestic violence offender programs). 
 70.  In addition to fear of retaliation as expressed by Sandra, women of color may refuse to 
cooperate with police investigations and avoid seeking police protection because they distrust the 
criminal justice system—a system Sandra obviously did not believe would protect her from Jerome. 
See BETH RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK 
WOMEN (1996) (discussing the reluctance of African American women to seek help for abuse from 
law enforcement); Rivera, supra note 63, at 245–48 (describing the internal conflict Latinas may 
face in using police to prevent domestic violence). 
 71.  Appearances of “financial independence” can also be deceiving, especially given the 
present economic climate in which most working people are mired in debt. See Deborah M. 
Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic Violence, DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037606 (discussing 
the relevance of current economic conditions to domestic violence). See also Jody Raphael, 
Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 367, 369 (2003) 
(detailing the numerous and complex ways batterers sabotage victims’ economic independence).  
 72.  See, e.g., Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 881 (showing how 
intersectional stereotypes about black men and women differ from one another). 
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opposition to the perfect victim.73 Stereotypes about black men and Latinos 
render them more likely to be perceived as perpetrators of crime, including 
domestic violence, than white men.74 Just as the stereotypical attributes of 
white women mirror the attributes of the perfect victim (and femininity more 
generally), the stereotypical attributes of white men tend to mirror ideals of 
masculinity, including qualities such as intelligence, self-reliance, 
leadership, breadwinning ability, competitiveness, competence, and 
aggression.75 Put another way, “white heterosexual male identity is socially 
construed to be normative.”76 Masculinity scholars refer to such ideals as 
hegemonic masculinity or “masculinity [that] identifies the most 
empowered, those at the top of the male hierarchy.”77 Not only is the 
masculinity of white men associated with hegemonic masculinity, 
hegemonic masculinity is associated with whiteness and white privilege.78 
In contrast, the masculinities attributed to men of color are 
pathologized, subordinate, and associated with criminality.79 Black men, for 
example, are stereotyped as “animalistic, crime-prone, and sexually 
unrestrained.”80 Similarly, Latinos are stereotyped as unintelligent, 
untrustworthy, and dangerous.81 In addition, Latinos are subject to 
stereotypes relating to actual or perceived nationality and status as 
 
 73.  See Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1080 (“The construction 
of the ‘battered woman’ identity needs an ‘other,’ which is an abusive man on the micro level, and 
patriarchal society on a macro level.”). Cf. Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: 
The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157 (2007) (discussing how 
perpetrators are constructed in relation to victims in federal anti-trafficking law).  
 74.  See, e.g., D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?: Exponential 
Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 NEB. L. REV. 552, 564–65 (2008) (contrasting stereotypes 
about white men and black men).  
 75.  Id. at 565; Fiske, supra note 68, at 357–61.  
 76.  Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 97, 105 
(2000) [hereinafter Carbado, Straight] (describing heterosexual white men as “Mankind. The 
baseline. He is our reference. We are all defined with Him in mind. We are the same as or different 
from Him.”). 
 77.  NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 27 
(2010). 
 78.  See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 1521 (2010) 
(describing the reference point for whiteness as “the most privileged version of whiteness—a white, 
non-ethnic, middle-class, heterosexual male”). 
 79.  See DOWD, supra note 77, at 27 (explaining masculinity is subject to hierarchies among 
men, with “subordinate masculinities defined especially by race and class”). See also id. at 61 
(describing hegemonic masculinity as dominating among multiple, competing masculinities, 
including those that are subordinate and/or subversive). 
 80.  Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 875–76 (citing N. Jeremi 
Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2004)). 
 81.  Rivera, supra note 63, at 240 n.47 (citing Richie Pérez, From Assimilation to 
Annihilation: Puerto Rican Images in U.S. Films, 2 CENTRO BULL. 8, 12 (1990)). 
548 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice [16:2013] 
immigrants that associate them with violence, immorality and criminality.82 
Like Latinas, Latinos are thought to be incapable of assimilation to dominant 
(white) cultural norms.83 In contrast, black men may be viewed by whites as 
able to assimilate into white culture if they choose to downplay their race 
and become what Cooper calls the “Good Black Man.”84 However, this 
perceived potential for compliance with white norms helps justify the 
suppressed social status and criminalization of other black men, who are 
labeled “bad.”85 To be “good,” black men must also downplay their 
masculinity.86 In sum, for men of color, masculinity itself is problematic, 
and attributes that tend to be viewed as positive in white men, such as 
aggression, are more likely to be viewed as menacing when embodied in 
black and brown male bodies.87 
As argued by Cooper, this intersection of male gender with 
heterosexuality and subordinate racial status results in a subordinate status 
that is different in form and function from the intersectional subordination of 
women in the same group.88 Cooper describes the “bipolar” images of 
heterosexual black men as compared to stereotypes about black women: 
[T]he Bad Black Man image emanates in part from a gender-
specific assumption that heterosexual black men are a threat to the 
sexual security of white women. There are also assumptions about 
sexual deviance of black women, but they are often designed to 
make black women seem as though they are available for use by 
white men. On the flipside, the Good Black Man image seems to 
be motivated in part by a desire to induce heterosexual black men 
to desexualize ourselves in order to make whites comfortable. In 
contrast, the image of the desexualized black woman is often 
 
 82.  Id. at 240. Latinos are also subject to the same negative stereotypes affecting black and 
dark-skinned men more generally. See also Ian Haney López, Race and Colorblindness After 
Hernandez and Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 61, 63 (2005). 
 83.  STEVEN BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE AMERICAN 
IMAGINATION 2, 129 (2003). 
 84.  Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 881. 
 85.  Id. at 888–95 (arguing the Good Black Man/Bad Black Man dichotomy functions to 
soothe white anxiety and legitimize racial caste in the post-civil rights era). 
 86.  See, e.g., id. at 886 (describing “desexualization” as part of the Good Black Man image). 
Sexuality, and heterosexuality in particular, is a critical component of masculinity. See DOWD, supra 
note 77, at 62 (characterizing not being a woman and not being gay as the most critical components 
of the definition of masculinity). 
 87.  See, e.g., Lacy, supra note 74, at 566 (detailing the ways in which black men are trapped 
between being viewed as either not masculine enough (e.g., because they are not viewed as 
possessing positive masculine traits such as breadwinner, good father, etc.), or too masculine, and 
therefore threatening).  
 88.  Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 879. See also Weatherspoon, 
supra note 8, at 34–36 (making a similar argument). 
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linked to a criticism of inadequately feminine black women as 
emasculating black men and thereby bringing down the black 
community.89 
In addition, while both men and women of color are subject to negative (and 
sometimes overlapping) stereotypes, the results are not identical. In the 
context of domestic violence, while the stereotypes about women of color 
render them less likely to be viewed as deserving victims regardless of harm, 
the association of criminality with men of color renders them more 
vulnerable to being perceived as perpetrators, regardless of guilt.90 
Guilt was not the issue in Jerome and Steve’s family court cases, of 
course. At that stage, there was no doubt that both men had committed 
criminal acts of violence against their former partners.91 Moreover, their 
criminal convictions were identical and the underlying crimes were very 
similar.92 The only question was whether their prior violence indicated a 
propensity for future violence.93 In this context, the judge determined that 
Jerome was enough of a safety risk to justify an order for ongoing, 
professionally-monitored visitation. In contrast, the judge allowed Steve to 
see his children without supervision. Thus, Sandra may have been successful 
in part because Jerome was a perceivable perpetrator—an individual 
recognized by the judge as accountable for his past acts and capable of 
future acts of domestic violence—and Madeline may have lost in part 
because Steve did not conform to stereotypes about Latino perpetrators and 
therefore was not so perceived. However, viewing Jerome and Steve as 
intersectional subjects does not, by itself, explain why the judge made this 
distinction between them. This discrepancy shows the need for another layer 
of inquiry, into how the parties performed their respective intersectional 
identities. 
B.  Identity Performance and Intragroup Distinctions 
Intersectionality highlights intragroup distinctions: for example, the 
category “African American” consists of women as well as men, gays and 
lesbians as well as heterosexuals, and so on.94 Conventional intersectional 
 
 89.  Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 860–61. 
 90.  See Weatherspoon, supra note 8, at 34–36 (citations omitted) (arguing, “[n]egative images 
of African-American men as being ‘bogeymen’ and ‘predators’ have become so prevalent that when 
African-American males are falsely accused of committing a vicious criminal act, law enforcement 
authorities and the public automatically assume they are guilty”). 
 91.  See supra Part II. 
 92.  See supra Part II. 
 93.  See Meier, supra note 34, at 700–03 (discussing the future-oriented nature of judicial 
determinations about child custody).  
 94.  See The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 702 (describing intersectionality as pushing 
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analysis does not show, however, how individuals within these intragroup 
categories are heterogeneous in their identities, or the way the experience of 
identity may be relational, contextual, and change over time.95 For this 
added layer of complexity, scholars incorporate theories of identity 
performance to add to the insights of intersectionality.96 The premise is 
twofold. First, that individuals have agency even within the constraint of 
socially constructed status categories like race and gender.97 Second, that 
they may be discriminated against not only for their inter- and intra-group 
differences (e.g., for their race, or their race plus gender), but also for how 
they exercise agency with regard to their performance of their identity.98 
Simply put, the point is that not everyone “does” race, gender, or other 
aspects of identity in the same way; the results of a performance depend on 
the expectations of the audience. As illustrated by Devon Carbado and Mitu 
Gulati in the employment context: 
[W]hile it is certainly true that a firm might prefer Asian American 
women to Asian American men (an intra-racial distinction), it is 
also true that a firm might prefer quiet and passive Asian American 
women to Asian American women who do not exhibit those 
characteristics (an intra-racial performance distinction).99 
Therefore, Carbado and Gulati argue, it is essential to consider performance 
as well as identity to understand an individual’s vulnerability to distinctions 
 
for recognition that particular social groups consist of multiple status identities).  
 95.  See infra Part IV (discussing contrasting intracategorical and intercategorical approaches 
to studying intersectionality). 
 96.  In particular, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have developed this field in the context of 
employment discrimination doctrine. See The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17; Devon W. Carbado 
& Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1265 n.11 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado 
& Gulati, Working Identity]. Cf. FRANK RUDY COOPER & ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITIES AND 
THE LAW 2 (2012) (applying multidimensionality theory to masculinities theory to arrive at similar 
conclusions by showing how “masculinities differ depending on the context and the other identities 
with which they overlap”). 
 97.  See, e.g., The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 701–02 (describing choices a man 
might make about presentation of his male status); Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, 
supra note 8, at 882–85 (describing the influence of environment on performance of black male 
identity). See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1895, 1916–25 (2007) (describing assimilationist strategies adopted by people of color including 
“accommodating,” “distancing”, and “resigned modeling”); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 
769, 772 (2002) (describing how outsiders deemphasize or “cover” their differences to make insiders 
feel more comfortable). Identity theory is closely associated with the work of Judith Butler. See, e.g., 
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND 
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). For a discussion of how the focus of Carbado and Gulati’s 
work differs from Butler’s, see Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 96, at 1265 n.11. 
 98.  See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 21–22 
(2006) (explaining that possession of the desired social attributes (e.g., whiteness) is less important 
in the modern era than acting as though one possesses them (e.g., acting white)).  
 99.  The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 703.  
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based on difference.100 
The concept of performance helps operationalize the interaction of 
structural subordination and stereotype within intersectional theory. 
Performance helps determine, for example, whether Jerome was a “Good 
Black Man” or a “Bad Black Man”; whether Madeline was more like a 
submissive “Maria” or a hotheaded “Anita.”101 Incorporating the concept of 
performance into an analysis of intersectionality also suggests that other, 
more expressive facts and dimensions of the parties might affect their 
perceived satisfaction of victim or perpetrator status and should be 
considered, such as their dress, hairstyle, and mannerisms.102 To the extent 
that witnesses may be seen as an extension of the parties, their performance 
should be considered as well. 103 In the family law cases, using this wider 
lens allows us to consider the possible impact that certain factors may have 
on the judge’s decision-making, such as Madeline’s white mother-in-law, 
whose involvement with Steve (he lived with her) and her grandchildren was 
strategically deployed at trial by Steve’s attorney to seemingly great effect. 
As a witness for Steve, Madeline’s mother-in-law’s performance of a 
competent mother and grandmother (through her dress and demeanor, and 
articulation of care and concern for Steve and her grandchildren) helped 
neutralize Steve as a perpetrator of violence by making him appear 
dependent and immature, rather than manipulative and dangerous. It also 
bolstered his capacity to care for young children (since she would be there 
during visitation), while providing a relatable foil for his misconduct 
(appealing to the bench officer’s sense of family ties and desire for 
grandchildren). The fact that Madeline and her mother-in-law were similarly 
positioned with regard to income and occupation (her mother-in-law was a 
secretary) may have also helped to eliminate any class disadvantage that 
Steve’s unemployment may have otherwise created for him, while reducing 
the appearance of Madeline’s vulnerability by emphasizing her relative 
financial independence. 
 
 100.  Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 96, at 1262–63 (deeming this type of 
distinction “‘racial conduct’ discrimination” because it “derives, not simply from the fact that an 
employee is, for example, phenotypically Asian American (i.e., her racial status) but also from how 
she performs her Asian-American identity in the workplace (i.e., her racial conduct)”).  
 101.  See Rivera, supra note 63, at 240 n.51.  
 102.  See, e.g., The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 717–19 (hypothesizing the effect of 
Afrocentric hair, dress and politics on the promotion opportunities for a black woman in a workplace 
defined by white norms of behavior).  
 103. Although outside the scope of this Article, one might also consider the role of attorney 
identity performance as a mitigating factor in perceived victim or perpetrator status. I am a white 
female; a white female represented Jerome as well. A white male represented Steve in both his civil 
and criminal case. Gender bias studies conducted in state (and federal) courts show evidence of 
pervasive bias on the part of male judges and lawyers toward female attorneys. See Karen 
Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on 
Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258–67 (1993). 
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One might argue that the success of this performance makes a single-
axis racial theory like the one disposed of before more credible: Madeline’s 
mother-in-law made Steve, a biracial man, look “more white,” and thus less 
like a perpetrator. Her whiteness, it could be argued, helped her to succeed 
in this role by enhancing her credibility.104 Taking into account the concept 
of performed intersectional identity, however, suggests that, while her race 
likely played a part in the outcome the hypothesis that it was, in itself, 
determinative of the outcome, is inaccurate. Just as racial minorities’ 
experiences of racism are not uniform, access by whites to the benefits of 
white privilege is not guaranteed; an analysis that takes intersectional 
identity and performance into account is still necessary.105 
Camille Gear Rich describes two factors that determine whether an 
individual can access benefits associated with a racial identity: racial 
identification, which is voluntary, and racial ascription, which is 
involuntary.106 Racial ascription relates not only to social understandings 
about race and the interpretation of phenotypical features, but “cultural, 
historical, or contemporary coalition-specific understandings of race” that 
are created in particular contexts.107 Whites with what Rich calls “low-status 
identity features”—such as those pertaining to gender, class, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation, and religion—may be denied access to white privilege by 
higher status whites.108 As Rich explains, “although a person may claim a 
‘white’ identity, she is merely a putative white person and therefore may not 
be socially recognized as white in all contexts.”109 
 
 104.  See Fiske, supra note 68 (discussing implicit racial biases affecting assessments of 
believability that benefit whites); see generally Damian A. Stanley et al., Implicit Race Attitudes 
Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic Trust Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. 7710 (2011) (same). See also Damian A. Stanley et al., Race and Reputation: Perceived Racial 
Group Trustworthiness Influences the Neural Correlates of Trust Decisions, 367 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 744 (2013), available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~mrbworks/ 
articles/2012_PhilTransRoyalSocB.pdf (discussing the neurological aspects of race-based decisions 
about trustworthiness). It could also help her more than if she had been Latina, specifically, because 
the attributes of Latino/a stereotypes run counter to the notion that a woman can control male family 
members. See Rivera, supra note 63, at 241 (“Accustomed to a male-centered community, the Latina 
is constructed [in relation to Latinos] as docile and domestic.”). See also Goodmark, When She 
Fights Back, supra note 4, at 100 (showing African American women are not perceived as credible 
by judges and juries).  
 105.  See Rich, supra note 78, at 1516 (explaining, “although the basic social privilege of being 
recognized as white is typically not questioned, . . . access in a given context to the material and 
dignitary benefits associated with whiteness” may be denied). 
 106.  Id. (coining the term “marginal whiteness” to describe “whites who only enjoy white 
privilege in contingent, context-specific ways”).  
 107.  Id. at 1517. 
 108.  Id. at 1519–20.  
 109.  Id. at 1517. But see generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1709 (1993) (proposing white racial privilege as a form of property owned by whites regardless of 
other status markers). For recent perspectives and controversies among Whiteness Study and Critical 
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In other words, Madeline’s mother-in-law had to perform her racial 
identity, and her success in that endeavor depended on the judge’s 
interpretation of multiple structural and expressive factors in addition to her 
race.110 In turn, even if she helped Steve appear racially white, his was also a 
putative whiteness, rendering his access to white heterosexual male privilege 
contingent and contextual. In this regard, Steve’s relative youth, physical 
attributes (he was short and overweight), and especially his mother’s 
involvement in his life, communicated weakness and would be negative 
factors in his ability to access the benefits afforded to straight white males in 
many contexts.111 But emasculation is also inconsistent with stereotypes 
about perpetrators.112 In this light, even evidence about Steve’s history of 
stealing from his employers may have made him look more ineffectual as an 
employee and provider than criminal and a likely perpetrator of future 
crimes.113 Thus, whether Steve was perceived as racially white or not, one 
result of Madeline’s mother-in-law’s performance was to distance Steve 
from the stereotype of the Latino perpetrator and perpetrators more 
generally, by insulating him from the masculinity that would normally be 
attributed to an adult male. On the other hand, to the extent he was perceived 
as white, he stood to benefit from the relative impunity that white men have 
historically enjoyed in perpetrating violence against women of color.114 
Additionally, by tipping the scales away from the dependency aspect of the 
perfect victim trope, Steve’s mother-in-law also distinguished Madeline 
from victim-conforming stereotypes about Latinas and may have allowed 
less advantageous stereotypes about hot-blooded Latinas to come forward. 
Madeline arguably remained more like the perfect victim than Sandra, 
who had fought back—vulnerable in appearance, she was delicate and petite, 
and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, which manifested as a type 
 
Race Theory scholars about analyzing differential access to power among whites, see Rich, supra 
note 78, at 1510–14 (collecting sources and discussing same). 
 110.  See Rich, supra note 78, at 1519–20 (explaining, “low-status identity features work [to 
exclude some whites from racial privilege] because some whites use these distinctions to judge the 
‘belongingness’ or relative status of other white persons”).  
 111.  As described by Dowd, a key to issues of power and hierarchy among men is “[t]he 
rejection of things female, things associated with mothers, [which] is lifelong. To admit weakness, to 
admit frailty or fragility, is to be seen as a wimp, a sissy, not a real man. The ultimate fear is to come 
up short in front of other men.” DOWD, supra note 77, at 62; see also John M. Kang, The Burdens of 
Manliness, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 477, 487–88 (2010) (describing the expectation men will 
distinguish themselves from women by appearing courageous). 
 112.  See Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1080 (citing DEL MARTIN, 
BATTERED WIVES 44 (1976)) (describing the man from whom the white victim must be protected as 
a “brute”). See also ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY 
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 106 (1987) (describing 
historical efforts by feminists to protect women from male “brutishness” in the home).  
 113.  See supra Part II. 
 114.  See Fenton, supra note 10, at 20 (discussing the role of racist ideologies in protecting 
white men’s sexual access to both white and black women). 
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of fugue state and often left her wide-eyed and clearly traumatized as she 
recounted harrowing episodes of abuse.115 Her vulnerability was 
underscored by Steve’s allegation that she had attempted suicide during their 
relationship.116 As a United States-born, English-speaking, semi-
professional, employed woman, she also appeared more assimilated (white) 
than anticipated by stereotypes about Latinas.117 Nonetheless, the judge 
viewed Steve as less of a future danger than Jerome, although he too was 
guilty of serious domestic abuse, and took evidence similar to that which 
was provided against Steve more seriously when it was presented against 
Jerome. 
In discussing these cases with others, people have asked me if Jerome’s 
appearance helped explain the difference in the judge’s response; 
specifically, if Jerome appeared in family court like a “thug” in his dress or 
manner.118 He did not. Nor did he appear like a corporate business executive, 
in a suit and a tie.119 He was similar to Sandra in manner and appearance: a 
casually but appropriately dressed individual who handled himself in a 
confident and straightforward manner; he and Sandra were also physically 
fit. However, while Sandra’s persona did not conform to the perfect victim, 
Jerome’s did not conform to the image of the neutered Good Black Man.120 
In a narrow repertoire of available images, this left him as the Bad Black 
Man—the quintessential perceivable perpetrator. With this image 
unmitigated by factors like those favoring Steve, the judge determined that 
Jerome posed an ongoing threat to Sandra and their child such that 
 
 115.  See Meier, supra note 34, at 691 (noting many victims are suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder while in court, which can distort their affect). 
 116.  See supra Part II. 
 117.  See supra Part II. 
 118.  I interpret this question to ask if Jerome wore clothing and accessories associated with 
hip-hop and African American youth culture. Other authors have considered the racial politics of 
clothing. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (1994) (“[S]eemingly 
inconsequential acts like listening to rap and wearing hip hop fashions constitute a means of racial 
affiliation and identification.”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 97 (discussing the racial implications 
of clothing policies for NBA players). 
 119.  See PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA 6 
(1999) (describing how the book’s subject, Larry Mungin, often dressed in professional business 
attire rather than casual clothes when out and about in his neighborhood in order to signal he was a 
“good” black man and put his white neighbors at ease); but see Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and 
Surburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a ‘Race-Making Situation,’ 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 
797–98 (2002) (detailing how professionally dressed blacks are still treated with suspicion by 
whites). 
 120.  Unlike Jerome, “[the] Good Black Man is ‘passive, nonassertive, and nonaggressive. He 
has made a virtue of identification with the aggressor, and he has adopted an ingratiating and 
compliant manner.’” Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 881 (citing BELL 
HOOKS, WE REAL COOL: BLACK MEN AND MASCULINITY 42 (2004)). 
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supervised visitation was required.121 While we cannot know precisely how 
the judge reached his decision, the routine operation of stereotype and the 
difference in outcomes in the two cases suggests that no matter how right the 
result in Sandra’s case in terms of evidence admitted about Jerome’s 
propensity for violence, Sandra received the orders she requested for the 
wrong reasons.122 Similarly, it suggests that Madeline was not awarded 
supervised visitation and was treated as blameworthy by the judge for 
reasons unrelated to the substance of her case.123 Only an analysis of the 
performed intersectional identities of all the actors in these cases—including 
perpetrators as well as victims—begins to unravel the differences in their 
outcomes. These results also suggest the importance of keeping in mind a 
structural analysis of relative privilege as well as subordination within the 
expanded intersectional approach laid out thus far. 
C.  Relative Privilege and the Victim–Perpetrator Dichotomy 
In extending the intersectional frame to consider the performed 
intersectional identities of both victim and perpetrator in relation to one 
another and in relation to outcomes, it is important to distinguish status 
advantages associated with structural privilege from situational privileges, 
and to distinguish individuals from the norms and stereotypes to which they 
are subjected.124 For example, because the operation of stereotypes rather 
than facts of the abuse help explain the difference in outcomes in Sandra and 
Madeline’s cases, the types of stereotypes attaching to Sandra’s identity as 
an African American woman could be understood as privileging her relative 
to Jerome, whose identity as an African American man is vulnerable to 
stereotypes of criminality more in keeping with a perpetrator of domestic 
 
 121.  See supra Part II (contrasting the visitation orders received by Sandra to those received by 
Madeline). Notably, Jerome would not have benefited from Sandra’s status as a woman of color in 
the way that Steve may have benefited if Steve were perceived by the judge as white. See Fenton, 
supra note 10, at 20 (distinguishing the historical function of racist ideology for black and white 
men; white men control black men’s access to black, as well as white, women). In addition, Jerome’s 
criminal history may have been perceived differently than Steve’s if the judge saw Steve as white. A 
study by sociologist Devah Pager in the employment context, for example, suggests that employers 
take the criminal convictions of white applicants less seriously than those of blacks. See DEVAH 
PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 98 
(2007) (“Blacks are less than half as likely to receive consideration by employers than equally 
qualified whites, and black nonoffenders fare no better than even those whites with prior felony 
convictions.”).  
 122.  See Rachlinski et al., supra note 35 (discussing the operation of implicit bias in judicial 
decision-making). 
 123.  See id. 
 124.  Melissa McEwan, Feminism 101: Situational and Relative Privilege, SHAKESVILLE (Mar. 
30, 2011), http://www.shakesville.com/2011/03/feminism-101-situational-and-relative.html (exp- 
laining situational as opposed to relative privilege). 
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violence.125 However, this analysis also suggests that Sandra’s success in the 
family law case was not based on any immutable characteristic that she 
possessed. Instead, she possessed, at most, a situational advantage that arose 
despite conduct and intersectional gender and racial stereotypes that might 
otherwise have distinguished her from a victim deserving of assistance, and 
because of sexual and racial stereotypes applied to Jerome. 
In contrast, white women possess, at a minimum, the putative “skin 
privilege” of whiteness.126 This means that advantages that white women 
experience related to race are not only situational, but also structural.127 
More specifically, when white women make claims based on domestic 
violence, they do not have to first overcome racial stereotypes that tend to 
defeat these claims (as black women do), or appear to fit within racial 
stereotypes more conducive to being viewed as victims (as Latinas do). 
Instead, they are likely to be viewed as race-neutral in a way that facilitates 
their claims.128 
This is different, however, from possessing the power of the perfect 
victim trope. Rather, those to whom whiteness is ascribed have the 
opportunity to benefit.129 Accordingly, although white women may be 
materially as well as putatively advantaged by the perfect victim stereotype, 
the stereotype is designed to protect hierarchy supporting white male 
privilege, not white women as individuals.130 Like other individuals who 
bring claims as victims of domestic violence, white women must appear 
opposite a perceivable perpetrator in order to get relief. Thus, individual 
white women bringing domestic violence claims can and should be analyzed 
in relation to other parties and to intersecting identities and stereotypes, and 
their identities should not be conflated with the perfect victim.131 
 
 125.  This is not to suggest that black women are not subject to stereotypes of criminality, but 
rather that those stereotypes are different than the ones applied to black men. See, e.g., COLLINS, 
supra note 44, at 5 (discussing stereotypical images of black women).  
 126.  See Rich, supra note 78, at 1517 (discussing putative whiteness). 
 127.  See Carbado, Straight, supra note 76, at 78 (pointing out, “[r]acism requires white 
privilege”). 
 128.  See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 871 (“Because the 
scaling of bodies creates a normative status within each identity category and ranks others against 
that norm, it renders invisible everyday norms that subordinate people with certain identity 
statuses.”). 
 129.  See Rich, supra note 78, at 1517 (distinguishing between the appearance of whiteness and 
ascription of racial privilege). See also John O. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as 
Performance: Status Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 106 (2005) 
(distinguishing privilege from identity, and asserting that “dominant whiteness” is not an individual 
identity). 
 130.  See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 871 (contending that 
western society is founded on the “scaling of bodies”—a hierarchy of identities with white, 
Christian, heterosexual male identity at the apex). 
 131.  See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White 
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These distinctions between types of privilege are not intended to 
diminish the importance of situational as well as more stable forms of status 
privilege. Consideration of the performance of identity shows that analyzing 
situational privilege is central to illuminating the operation of the perfect 
victim trope and the victim–perpetrator dichotomy; without it, for example, 
the basis for Sandra’s success in family court is obscured. Moreover, these 
forms are interrelated and context-specific.132 There is a structural 
disadvantage created when categories associated with privilege morph into 
subordinating constructs through stereotype: Jerome was disadvantaged in 
court as a black man if he was judged based on stereotypes rather than 
legally relevant facts.133 Yet, the same racial identity may have operated to 
his advantage when he abused Sandra during their relationship because, in 
addition to her concern that he might retaliate against her for reporting the 
abuse,134 she was undoubtedly aware that he might face discriminatory 
treatment by law enforcement if she cooperated with police.135 
Moreover, that Sandra battled the perfect victim trope despite her 
situational advantage in the family law case was evidenced during Jerome’s 
criminal trial. There, in light of strong facts in support of a conviction,136 the 
proffered defense was that Sandra was not a deserving victim—whether 
because she “deserved what she got” or because she did not deserve redress 
for the harm received—and thus was not a victim at all. The fact that Sandra 
had fought back on previous occasions was used to bolster this 
commonplace defense strategy.137 The police officer who charged Sandra 
with resisting arrest testified effectively in support of this theory, seemingly 
 
Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) (advocating for an anti-essentialist 
approach to analyzing white women). See also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three 
Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151 (2010) 
(detailing the synergies between the anti-essentialism of MacKinnon’s radical “dominance” 
feminism and intersectionality); Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of 
Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 257 (2002) (proposing 
white women as an example of “hybrid-intersectionality”). But see Sumi Cho, Understanding White 
Women’s Ambivalence Towards Affirmative Action: Theorizing Political Accountability in 
Coalitions, 71 UMKC L. REV. 399, 405–06 (2002) (arguing that applying intersectionality to white 
women risks minimizing their complicity in racism).  
 132.  See, e.g., Rich, supra note 78 (exploring the context-specific nature of white privilege). 
 133.  See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8 (establishing the 
intersectional subordination of heterosexual black men). 
 134.  See supra Part II. 
 135.  See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 98 (“African American women 
may feel particularly pressured to keep their affairs private . . . [because they] may feel that to break 
the silence is to bring further shame and disapprobation on African American men from the wider 
society.”). 
 136.  See supra Part II. Eyewitnesses saw Jerome assault Sandra and he was arrested at the 
location immediately afterwards. 
 137.  See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 10, at 32–33 (discussing the use of victim-bashing against 
now-iconic domestic violence victim Nicole Brown Simpson in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial).  
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in part because of her own feelings about Sandra’s behavior. Unlike the 
officers who testified about Jerome’s arrests, she did not have to refer to her 
police report even though the incident described in her testimony had 
happened more than a year before, and her irritation at the memory was 
obvious in her demeanor and inflection. Testimony was also admitted from 
witnesses who had, on other occasions, overheard Sandra cursing and 
yelling at Jerome. In this way, Sandra, not Jerome, appeared to be on trial, 
and her testimony appeared to be offered in her own defense. 
The defense’s strategy may have been partly successful—as mentioned 
above, the jury found Jerome guilty of a reduced domestic violence 
charge.138 Thus, part of the dichotomous relationship between victims and 
perpetrators is that each of the component parts is necessary to the other: if 
either fails, they both fail. Moreover, both are infused with stereotypes. 
Nonetheless, analyzing relative privilege should not be confused with 
relativity. To the extent Jerome was convicted (albeit of a lesser charge), and 
Sandra was successful in obtaining all the orders she sought in family court, 
she did not fail to meet the criteria for victimhood completely. What is 
unclear is the tipping point: at what juncture would Sandra have been too 
unlike the perfect victim to succeed against Jerome’s perpetrator? Similarly, 
in Madeline and Steve’s case, what difference in the identity or performance 
of any party or witness would have changed the outcome? To explore these 
questions, we need more data and an approach that facilitates studying both 
relative and situational privilege without conflating or confusing the two, or 
their significance to accountability for subordination.139 A related question 
also arises: how to make meaningful connections between forms of 
interlocking subordination (e.g., racism, sexism, and heterosexism) while 
continuing to develop a sufficiently nuanced analysis of the performed 
intersectionality of both victims and perpetrators. 
 
 138.  See supra note 20. Evidence about the “worthiness” of victims such as their criminal 
history is generally believed to impact jury verdicts, although the exact nature of the impact is 
unclear. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and 
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003) (analyzing studies of jury decision-making in 
capital murder cases). For example, while most jurors report that they were not influenced by 
evidence of victim characteristics, studies of deliberations in capital murder cases “suggest a fairly 
strong correlation between a juror’s perception that the victim had a troubled life . . . and an 
inclination to choose a life sentence rather than a death sentence.” Id. at 354.  
 139.  See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 870–71 (“Given that the 
singly and multiply subordinated share a common enemy in the scaling of bodies, we can address the 
need for an ethic of action that forges broad antisubordination coalitions.”). See also Trina Grillo & 
Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons 
Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397 (1991) (cautioning against 
comparing “-isms,” which tends to minimize the significance of difference and reinforce racial and 
other hierarchies). 
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IV.  REMAPPING INTERSECTIONALITY 
A.  Categorical Complexity and Intersectional Method 
Because the purpose of intersectionality is to render visible those 
experiences obscured by examining single categories of subordination alone, 
the purpose of intersectional method is to show the interrelationship of 
subordinating categories, thereby exposing the operation of power in 
everyday life.140 However, traditional intersectional method is limited in its 
ability to accomplish this because of the way it minimizes the complexity of 
categories. Adding perpetrators and performance in the case studies above 
demonstrates the benefits of adding what sociologist Leslie McCall 
describes as intercategorical comparisons to conventional intersectional 
method.141 
As McCall explains, the prototypical approach to studying 
intersectionality is to elaborate, through narrative or case study, the 
experiences of “a single social group at a neglected point of intersection of 
multiple master categories or a particular social setting or ideological 
construction, or both.”142 McCall refers to this approach as intracategorical 
because it is centered on the intersections existing within a defined social 
group—in effect, creating a new category located at the intersection of other 
categories and examining the dynamics of that intersection.143 She argues 
that this approach typically minimizes complexity in two ways. First, only 
one dimension of each intersectional category is studied.144 For example, 
considered individually within the category of victims of domestic violence, 
Sandra and Madeline exist at the intersection of multiple categories, but each 
represent only one dimension of the categories of gender, race/ethnicity, 
class, and sexuality. When considered together, they represent an intergroup 
comparison on the dimension of race/ethnicity only, as this is the only 
significant category in which they differ. Second, within the context of any 
particular intersectional analysis, other social groups are typically studied 
from the limited vantage point of the primary subject category rather than in 
terms of their own intersectional complexity; they enter “as background 
 
 140. See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1297 (describing intersectionality 
as “unveil[ing] the processes of subordination and the various ways those processes are experienced 
by people who are subordinated and people who are privileged by them”).  
 141.  See McCall, supra note 40, at 1773–74 (describing inter and intracategorical approaches 
in terms of “how they understand and use analytical categories to explore the complexity of 
intersectionality in social life”). 
 142.  See id. at 1780. 
 143.  Id. at 1781 (noting the groups being studied are often “‘new’ groups in the sense of having 
been named, defined, or elaborated upon in the process of deconstructing the original dimensions of 
the master category”). 
 144.  Id. at 1781. 
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contextual or discursive or ideological factors[.]”145 Thus, in domestic 
violence scholarship, the problems faced by low-income, heterosexual 
women of color as victims of domestic violence are typically examined by 
juxtaposing their experiences with the perfect victim, or with a gesture 
toward white, middle-class heterosexual women, rather than comparison to 
white, low-income heterosexual women, heterosexual middle-class women 
of color, and so on.146 The intersectional experiences of domestic violence 
victims in relation to perpetrators are rarely studied at all.147 
In contrast to intracategorical methods, the intercategorical approach is 
contextual and comparative.148 Inequality between existing social groups is 
assumed, without specifying which categories are of consequence at any 
given time.149 Therefore, intercategorical method is geared toward 
discerning which categories or points of intersection are significant in 
particular contexts, and identifying changes in relationships between social 
groups over time.150 The premise is that understanding these relationships 
requires studying multiple dimensions of any social category subject to 
analysis. Thus, the inclusion of gender as a category of analysis requires the 
study of both women and men; inclusion of race requires studying multiple 
racial/ethnic groups; including both race and gender requires examining the 
dimensions of each, and their intersections, and so on.151 Following the same 
logic, studying victims requires studying perpetrators along multiple 
dimensions of identity as well. In this approach, complexity is managed by 
strategies for analyzing data,152 and as a practical matter, by the data 
 
 145.  Id. at 1785–86.  
 146.  See id. at 1781 (noting scholars using the intracategorical method “may aspire to situate 
subjects within the full network of relationships that define their social locations, but usually it is 
only possible to situate them from the partial perspective of the particular social group under study 
(i.e., if an Arab woman is the subject of analysis, then issues of race and nationality are more fully 
examined from the perspective of Arab women than from the perspective of Arab men)”). 
 147.  An exception is an article by Devon Carbado detailing the discursive construction of false 
dichotomies of race and gender in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial. Devon W. Carbado, The 
Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1997). See also 
Fenton, supra note 10 (discussing the discursive construction of race and gender). 
 148.  McCall, supra note 40, at 1786 (characterizing the approach taken by intercategorical 
researchers as focused “on the complexity of relationships among multiple social groups within and 
across analytical categories and not on complexities within single social groups, single categories, or 
both”).  
 149.  Id. at 1785 (describing the intercategorical approach as treating identity categories as 
provisional, and in some formulations treating the question of “whether there are complex 
differences and inequalities between groups . . . as a hypothesis”). 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. at 1786. 
 152.  Id. at 1787 (explaining that data is analyzed in “studies of this kind by what at first 
appears to be a reductionist process—reducing the analysis to one or two between-group 
relationships at a time—but what in the end is a synthetic and holistic process that brings the various 
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available.153 
Both of these methods have strengths and drawbacks. The strength of 
the intracategorical approach is its depth of field: the centering and detailed 
elucidation of previously unknown or unacknowledged experiences of 
subordination.154 Scholarship on women’s acts of agency in the context of 
domestic violence is an excellent example of the richness of this work. For 
example, Goodmark’s work on victims who fight back examines the issue 
from the perspective of African American women and lesbians, two groups 
of women who she argues are more likely to engage in physical resistance to 
abuse due to structural subordination, and thus more likely to be excluded 
from domestic violence discourse due to stereotypes about passive 
victims.155 This approach is invaluable in identifying the negative impacts of 
the perfect victim stereotype on victims whom it further marginalizes. 
However, as demonstrated by the case studies of Sandra and Jerome and 
Madeline and Steve, studying a single dimension of the primary subject 
category under scrutiny (here, domestic violence victims) cannot fully 
capture, explain, or correct for the problems associated with the category 
(e.g., the perfect victim trope).156 That requires an intercategorical approach, 
which is comparative along multiple dimensions of the category under 
study, and here includes perpetrators as well as victims. 
The strengths of the intercategorical approach are twofold. First, it is 
able to capture relative advantage and disadvantage within and between 
multiple social groups, and in relation to specific social conditions or 
systems.157 For example, in a large-scale intercategorical study of wage 
inequality in regional United States economies across dimensions of race, 
gender, and class, McCall found that patterns of inequality differed 
depending on the type of economy in the region.158 Post-industrial 
economies exhibited greater inequality by race and class than by gender, 
while regions with recent deindustrialization showed greater gender 
inequality.159 In addition, when broken down by class, there was more 
gender inequality among college-educated workers in postindustrial 
 
pieces of the analysis together”). 
 153.  Id. at 1787 n.21 (noting the creation of new racial and ethnic categories in the United 
States census has allowed researchers to incorporate “increasing numbers and combinations of 
racial, ethnic, and national groups in their analyses”). 
 154.  See Dhamoon, supra note 17, at 234 (observing the point of this elucidation is not only 
the representation of identity or categories of difference, but the exposure of “techniques of power”). 
 155.  Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4. 
 156.  See supra Part II (detailing how conventional intersectional analysis fails to explain the 
different outcomes in these cases). 
 157.  See McCall, supra note 40, at 1788–90 (describing studies that employ this approach). 
 158.  Id. at 1789–90. 
 159.  Id. 
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economies than in recently deindustrialized economies; in the latter, there 
was greater gender inequality among non-college educated workers.160 Thus, 
not only were working women shown to be disadvantaged in varying 
degrees relative to working men, some women were shown to be 
disadvantaged relative to other women in certain economic environments.161 
Second, as also illustrated by the example above, the intercategorical 
method is able to distinguish between conditions where categories intersect 
and where they do not. As intersectionality scholar Jennifer Nash recently 
observed, identifying “the conditions that permit race and gender (and other 
categories) to intersect would allow us to better understand the mechanisms 
by which structures of domination are bolstered and reproduced.”162 
Intercategorical research methods can accomplish this task. Moreover, 
identifying such mechanisms and their effects allows for strategizing more 
accurately targeted solutions. Using the wage inequality research data 
discussed previously, for example, McCall proposes that post-industrial 
economies might benefit from non-gender-specific strategies for reducing 
wage inequality, like living wage campaigns, while deindustrialized regions 
would benefit from comparative worth or affirmative action approaches.163 
In contrast, intracategorical approaches may result in recommendations that 
are only partial solutions. Proposals aimed at making courts more responsive 
to domestic violence victims without considering the ways in which 
stereotypes about perpetrators affect outcomes, for example, are unlikely to 
be completely effective. 
On the other hand, complexity grows exponentially as intercategorical 
comparisons are added. Applications of intercategorical method may 
become unmanageable or incoherent; thus, researchers will inevitably look 
for tradeoffs on the level of complexity in order to make the project more 
manageable.164 McCall herself notes that it is difficult to undertake 
intercategorical research or to publish the results due to the size of the 
project.165 Thus, the point is not to suggest that studying intersectionality 
requires fully engaging intercategorical methods, but that adding 
intercategorical comparisons leads to a more effective analysis of 
 
 160.  Id. at 1790. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Nash, supra note 40, at 469. 
 163.  See McCall, supra note 40, at 1790. 
 164.  Id. at 1786. Both methods also involve tradeoffs on the level of complexity that may be 
sought along any dimension. For example, greater differentiation along racial lines might require 
reducing complexity along class lines. See id. at 1786–87 (“In this respect, intercategorical 
researchers face some of the same trade-offs between scale and coherence or difference and 
sameness that intracategorical researchers face in determining the appropriate level of detail for their 
studies.”).  
 165.  Id. at 1787–88. 
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intersectional subordination. 
The case studies of Sandra and Jerome and Madeline and Steve 
demonstrate the contribution made by even a modest intercategorical effort. 
Examining the intersectional identities of both perpetrators and victims 
reveals the paradoxically illusory and powerful nature of the perfect victim 
trope, including the way its constituent parts—although culturally fused with 
privilege—can be disaggregated and operate independently of one another, 
or be suspended, in different contexts. Thus, Sandra, neither dependent nor 
passive nor white, was successful opposite her African American ex-
boyfriend, while Madeline was unsuccessful opposite her emasculated ex-
husband, although appearing more like the perfect victim than Sandra. 
However, while the judge may have refused to issue orders for supervised 
visitation because Steve did not appear like the stereotypical perpetrator, this 
does not mean that the perfect victim stereotype had no effect on the 
outcome of Madeline’s family law case. A perceived departure from the 
characteristics of the perfect victim could explain why the judge also treated 
Madeline as culpable for Steve’s past abuse.166 In this way, the perfect 
victim stereotype may function like the Good Black Man/Bad Black Man 
binary to justify hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion, wherein the 
exclusion of victims that do not conform to the stereotype is justified by the 
fact that some victims—like Sandra, who also battled the perfect victim 
trope—are more successful. To the extent that Madeline’s exclusion from 
the category of deserving victims turned on the fact that she worked and was 
not dependent on Steve financially, the disconnect between gender 
stereotypes and the economic dimensions of domestic violence is also 
revealed.167 Moreover, an intercategorical analysis of the outcomes in 
Sandra and Madeline’s cases that includes the perpetrators offers the 
opportunity for drawing a broader conclusion from the comparison, namely 
that there is no ideal regarding victims operating consistently in the law. 
Rather, the judge favored neither woman and instead used a complex lens of 
social identity to “see” a perpetrator in one case, and not so much in the 
other. 
Thus, an intercategorical analysis of the perfect victim leads toward a 
better understanding of the interplay of multiple axes of subordination and 
privilege, while also bringing into clearer view the workings of single 
categories like gender on the one hand and race on the other. It also hints at 
the possibility for a much-needed infusion of economic issues into the 
 
 166.  See supra Part II (explaining that the judge imposed parenting classes on Madeline and 
treated her as culpable for the abuse). 
 167.  See Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three Approaches, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 42–44 (2009) (discussing the interconnected nature of class, race, and 
gender). See also Weissman, supra note 71 (detailing the failure of domestic violence theories to 
adequately address the economic dimensions of abuse). 
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analysis of domestic violence.168 In addition, an intercategorical approach to 
examining the outcomes for victims demonstrates the importance of 
considering the multi-dimensionality of sex, gender, and sexuality. 
As detailed by Richard Delgado, racial/ethnic stereotypes like those 
underlying the victim–perpetrator dichotomy support taboos that protect race 
and gender privilege.169 Most relevant here is the taboo of interracial sex, 
which is supported by stereotypes that pathologize the sexualities of men 
and women of color.170 Thus, as Delgado and other Critical Race Scholars 
have observed, sexuality is a lynchpin in support of heterosexual white male 
privilege.171 Yet, scholarship about domestic violence rarely considers 
sexuality as relevant to case outcomes outside the context of LGBTQ172 
relationship violence; similarly, scholarship about heterosexual relationship 
violence tends to treat gender as sex-conforming.173 Examining both sides of 
the victim–perpetrator dichotomy highlights the importance of 
deconstructing and analyzing gender in terms of sex (e.g., through the 
performance of gender identity) and sexuality (e.g., through the 
sexualization of race and the racialization of sexuality) in the context of 
heterosexual relationship violence as well. Moreover, the benefits of using 
an intercategorical approach suggest that studying sexuality in both contexts 
and across multiple dimensions while including both victims and 
perpetrators would strengthen understanding of the ways in which 
heteronormativity, racism, and gender supremacy function both together and 
separately. 
However, while application of an intercategorical approach shows the 
benefit of building an analysis of the more general workings of power 
 
 168.  See Weissman, supra note 71 (urging scholars to examine the class and economic issues 
related to domestic violence). 
 169.  See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and U.S. Civil 
Rights, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1691, 1720 (2007) (describing the taboos applicable to racial/ethnic 
groups based on what the dominant society needs to extract from the group at any given time). 
 170.  Id. at 1720–24 (describing taboos regarding interracial sexual contact that, while varying 
by race/ethnicity, all characterize men of color as sexually dangerous or undesirable). 
 171.  See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 10, at 19 (characterizing stereotypes of race and gender as 
“unified around the common axis of sexuality”). See also Delgado, supra note 169, at 1719 
(contending that whites impose taboos to control one another: “‘If you want people to avoid 
something, you induce a feeling of disgust. You tell them it’s slimy. Or dirty. Or bad for you. Then, 
they’ll avoid it. It will be instinctive, something they do without even thinking about it, like recoiling 
from a snake.’”). 
 172.  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning. As used in this Article, LGBTQ is 
also intended to include intersex and other non-heteronormative persons who identify by other terms.  
 173.  Feminists do, of course, analyze domestic violence in heterosexual relationships as 
gendered violence. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING 5 (2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN] (describing the relationship 
between heterosexual intimate partner violence and gender inequality); see also Weissman, supra 
note 71 (discussing the economic aspect of hegemonic male gender roles as a potential cause of 
domestic violence).  
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through the systematic comparison of multiple dimensions of privilege and 
subordination, existing approaches to intersectional analysis that limit 
categorical complexity also tend to inhibit making connections within and 
between categories. Thus, integrating the benefits of intra-and 
intercategorical approaches requires rethinking the ways in which categories 
are organized in relation to one another within the analytical structure of 
intersectionality. The framework of “particularity” and “generality” is 
helpful for interpreting the significance of these issues for domestic violence 
theory and practice. 
B.  Complexity, Particularity, and Generality 
Feminist theorist Elizabeth Schneider coined the terms “particularity” 
and “generality” to describe the relationship between women’s 
individualized experiences of domestic violence, including those analyzed 
by intersectionality (particularity), and larger social problems of violence 
and subordination (generality).174 According to Schneider, particularity 
requires “describing the complexity of women’s experiences non-
simplistically, accurately, and in greater detail.” At the same time, Schneider 
argues, those experiences must be connected to “the more ‘general’ 
dimensions of the problem.”175 Schneider identifies two components of the 
general: “first, the way in which [women’s experience of domestic violence] 
must be viewed as linked to larger problems of societal violence; and, 
second, as linked to women’s subordination in general.”176 
The relationship between particularity and generality is dialectical as 
well as interdependent in nature.177 The inclusiveness of the particular 
informs the rigor and utility of an analysis of the general problem; the 
identification of the general problem helps determine the way particular 
experiences are identified as relevant and the way they are understood. For 
example, understandings of domestic violence based on universalized 
narratives drawn from the experiences of white, middle-class, heterosexual 
women have limited the explanatory power of theories about why domestic 
violence happens, and to whom.178 Paradoxically, stereotypes attributing the 
 
 174.  See generally Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 54 (introducing the 
concepts of particularity and generality). See also SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, 
at 59–73 (discussing generality and particularity). 
 175.  Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 54, at 527. 
 176.  Id.  
 177.  See id. at 528 (relating the dialectic between generality and particularity to a similar 
dialectic between theory and practice). 
 178.  See supra Part II (discussing the origins of the perfect victim trope in domestic violence 
legal discourse). See also SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 62–71 (discussing the 
need for an expansion of feminist conceptions of battering).  
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problem of domestic violence to the working and lower-classes also limit 
understanding of the problem.179 As explained, intersectionality challenges 
the first approach and complicates the second with more particularized 
descriptions of domestic violence based on the experiences of individuals 
subject to multiple forms of subordination.180 However, as Schneider 
explains, the construction of a battered woman identity is in itself 
“particular,”181 and focusing solely on particularity is problematic for 
reasons other than inclusivity: 
While the development of a distinct legal construct concerning 
male battering of women has been theoretically important and 
strategically necessary, moving to the more general level of 
violence between intimates and women’s subordination can 
illuminate theoretical and strategic issues that advance our work. 
Paradoxically, this very emphasis on particularity, on the 
distinctiveness of battered women’s experiences, has had an 
unintended effect of compounding the problems of battered women 
because we have insufficiently connected battered women’s 
experiences to both the larger and more general problems of 
women and to those of violence between intimates.182 
According to Schneider, problems for battered women created by an over-
reliance on a particularized battered woman identity include a persistent 
focus by media and policymakers “on the individual woman and her 
‘pathology’ instead of on the batterer and the social structures that support 
the oppression of women and that glorify or otherwise condone violence.”183 
Therefore, Schneider argues that feminists should strengthen domestic 
violence theory and practice by being simultaneously more particular in 
elucidating the diversity of individual experiences of domestic violence and 
 
 179.  See PTACEK, supra note 53, at 20–21 (noting that feminists promoted universalized 
narratives partly in response to these stereotypes). See also Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Reading 
Between the Lines Is Not Enough: Lessons from Media Coverage of a Domestic Violence Homicide-
Suicide, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 269, 285 (2009) [hereinafter MacDowell, Reading 
Between the Lines] (noting that both approaches reinforce hegemonic narratives about domestic 
violence). 
 180.  See supra Part II (discussing the contribution of intersectionality theory to understandings 
of women’s experiences of domestic violence).  
 181.  See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 60–62 (detailing problems 
associated with the battered woman identity, including its reductive, totalizing nature (reducing the 
entirety of a victim’s identity to the experience of battering), its rhetorical effect of locating the 
problem in the victim (as opposed to suggesting she has been subjected to an external harm), and its 
association with negative stereotypes of helplessness rather than resistance).  
 182.  Id. at 72. 
 183.  Id. at 72. But see MacDowell, Reading Between the Lines, supra note 179, at 273–76 
(detailing how routine production of news, rather than failed feminist accounts, results in hegemonic 
representations of domestic violence crimes). 
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more concerted in their effort to connect those experiences to more general 
issues of subordination.184 
As detailed above, however, the intracategorical approach traditionally 
used by intersectional theorists limits the analysis of particularity (and thus 
generality) in at least three interrelated ways. First, the analysis of 
particularity is limited because intracategorical approaches typically focus 
on single dimensions of multiple categories (like the victim half of the 
victim–perpetrator dichotomy) rather than multiple dimensions of each.185 
Second, the analysis of particularity is limited because the focus of 
intracategorical inquiry is typically on individuals subject to multiple 
intersecting axes of subordination (like low-income women of color) rather 
than persons subject to intersections of privilege and subordination (like 
middle-class, heterosexual men of color).186 As a result, to the extent that 
intracategorical analysis includes an analysis of privilege, it is typically a 
byproduct rather than a focus of the inquiry and—lacking a comparative 
dimension—is necessarily incomplete.187 Third, the intracategorical 
approach limits the development of particularity because, to the extent that it 
results in newly-analyzed categories of experience (like more detailed 
accounts of the experiences of particular women of color or sexual 
minorities, or as recommended herein, the experiences of perpetrators), it 
lacks a methodological component for making connections between new 
categories, and between new and other, pre-existing categories. Simply 
adding additional, more detailed accounts does not solve this problem, or—
absent meaningful connections at the level of particularity—result in a 
coherent, generalized account. Thus, in addition to more detailed accounts, it 
is necessary to add a systematic, comparative component to intersectional 
analysis. To cast further light on this problem, it is useful to consider 
particularity and generality in terms of a spatial analogy in which they have 
vertical and horizontal aspects. These aspects are evident in feminist theory 
 
 184.  SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 59. 
 185.  See supra Part IV (comparing inter and intracategorical approaches to studying 
intersectionality). 
 186.  See supra Part IV. See also Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 
856; Ehrenreich, supra note 131, at 272–73 (arguing the analyses of most intersectionality theorists 
“imply that the intersectional effect is relevant only when two subordinated statuses are interacting 
to affect the individual (or subgroup)”); Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 9, at 311–12 
(observing, “intersectionality usually focuses primarily upon the reality of intersecting 
subordination”). 
 187.  See Sylvia Walby et al., Intersectionality: Multiple Inequalities in Social Theory, 46 SOC. 
224, 227 (2012) (arguing that by focusing on agency within disadvantaged groups intersectionality 
loses sight of power and racist structures). One might object that this is not a problem of 
intracategorical analysis per se, but simply a shortcoming of the literature. In other words, 
intracategorical research could examine intersections of privilege and subordination, but generally 
does not. Thus, it is unclear how it limits the development of particularity. However, while 
intracategorical method might be used to explore relative privilege, it does not facilitate the type of 
comparative inquiry from which these intersections are revealed. 
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and in the dominant domestic violence discourse that feminist theory is 
responsible in part for shaping. 
In their vertical aspect, particularity and generality can be viewed as a 
layered hierarchy of connections between categories, concepts, and issues 
that build from the most specific (or particular) at the base to the most 
general at the top. For example, the highest level of the general in a given 
line of reasoning about domestic violence might be family violence 
(including children and elders as well as intimate partners), violence against 
women, or some other more general category, under which are categories of 
increasing specificity, such as intimate partner violence, battering of women 
of color, and so on.188 In contrast, the horizontal aspects of particularity and 
generality involve the development of categories that appear discrete in 
relation to one another.189 This is illustrated by the categories of 
heterosexual and LGBTQ relationship violence. In feminist theory, law, and 
popular culture, domestic violence is generally synonymous with the abuse 
of women by men.190 In turn, relationship violence involving same-sex or 
transgender individuals is typically categorized (and as noted above, 
analyzed) as distinct from heterosexual relationship violence, such that 
mutually exclusive categories based on sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity are created. Since they are generally considered distinct, these 
categories can be viewed as silos, horizontally arranged in relation to one 
another. Figure 1 illustrates the horizontal and vertical aspects of 







 188.  In their vertical aspect, particularity and generality can also be conceptualized as the 
relationship between micro and macro level analyses and processes. Patricia Hill Collins, for 
example, distinguishes between intersectionality (which she defines as the analysis of particular 
forms of intersecting oppressions) and the organization of interlocking oppressions. COLLINS, supra 
note 44, at 18. Collins defines a matrix of domination as “the overall organization of hierarchical 
power relations for any society.” Id. at 299 (defining matrix in the glossary). Generality would 
include Collins’s matrix of domination, but also refers to less expansive constructs like violence 
against women.  
 189.  Cf. Robert Westley, Reparations and Symbiosis: Reclaiming the Remedial Focus, 71 
UMKC L. REV. 419, 423 (2002) (describing social group identities such as “woman” as multiplying 
with increasing specificity along a vertical axis, and social groups as proliferating along a horizontal 
axis as a result of the application of antiessentialist or intersectional theory). See also Ehrenreich, 
supra note 131, at 270 (describing the former as a problem of “infinite regress”). 
 190.  See Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction 
of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 614–15 (1996) 
(describing a “dominant domestic violence discourse” that equates domestic violence with 
heterosexual relationships); SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 68 (“The 
mainstream domestic violence movement has long operated from a heterosexist perspective.”). 














Absent a comparative method for linking categories, both the vertical 
and horizontal aspects of generality and particularity present dangers to the 
rigor and utility of domestic violence theory. The danger of the horizontal 
aspect lies in the apparent lack of relationship between categories. In their 
horizontal construction, categories multiply as islands of difference, with 
little or no basis for communication across differences that might lead to 
greater understanding, collective knowledge, or action.191 A danger of the 
vertical aspect lies in relating more particular categories, such as domestic 
violence against black women or Latinas, to more general categories, such as 
violence against women, without first relating them to each other. When 
moving from particularity to generality in this fashion, individuals or groups 
analyzed with particularity tend to remain mere examples of ways in which 
 
 191.  There is also a problem of collective action in the theoretical collapsing of vertical 
categories, but (as explained below) as a result of exclusion rather than a lack of shared 
understanding. Cf. Westley, supra note 189, at 423 (describing both the vertical and horizontal 
aspects of identity theory as having tendencies that threaten collective action).  
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subordination happens, rather than usable data from which general 
principles regarding the operation of power structures like racism and 
heteropatriarchy can be extracted. For the same reason, the vertical aspect of 
particularity and generality also tends to perpetuate dominant narratives 
about domestic violence. This is one way to understand the tendency in 
feminist theory to conflate intimate partner violence against women and 
heterosexual battering: the particularity of categories that do not fit within 
the dominant narrative (like violence in lesbian relationships) has been left 
out of the more general analysis.192 This does not mean that groups outside 
the dominant narrative like lesbians, are never analyzed with particularity; as 
discussed above, lesbians have been the subject of careful intracategorical 
inquiry. However, absent a comparative methodology, the significance of 
their particular experiences tends to remain unincorporated into general 
accounts of domestic violence.193 
In this way, both the horizontal and vertical aspects of generality and 
particularity can result in the breakdown of domestic violence theory and 
praxis due to the failure of particularity. Returning to the prior examples, 
both the subsuming of particular experiences within dominant narratives (by 
which domestic violence is equated with violence within heterosexual 
relationships) and the isolation of horizontal categories (by which 
heterosexual and LGBTQ relationship violence are siloed) tend to omit 
lesbian women who are battered and not in heterosexual relationships from 
the dominant discourse about domestic violence. Intracategorical method 
cannot solve this problem because it lacks a comparative or other 
methodological element for linking categories. Moreover, the intersectional 
identities and experiences of perpetrators, including heterosexual men of 
color (like Steve and Jerome), are subject to even greater erasure from both 
the dominant discourse and critical theory about domestic violence because 
they are not typically identified as significant to the analysis of gender 
violence as individuals, and therefore are not analyzed with any 
particularity.194 In each instance, the feminist analysis of gender and gender 
 
 192.  See Goldfarb, supra note 190, at 603–04 (discussing the exclusion of gays and lesbians 
from feminist accounts of domestic violence that also fail to circumscribe the subject of their 
inquiry). 
 193.  It is also the case that LGBTQ relationship violence tends to be under-analyzed, perhaps 
in part because it appears more particular than it really is in comparison to heterosexual relationship 
violence.  
 194.  As described by Dowd: 
[M]en have been largely absent from feminist theory as an object of gender analysis, 
and thus they have tended to be viewed in an essentialist, universal, undifferentiated 
way. Men have been viewed as a class or group, as a basis for comparison . . . ; as the 
source of subordination by virtue of gender privilege or abusive power . . . ; as 
beneficiaries of gender privilege by virtue of norms that presume men as the subject . . 
. . While this placement of men in feminist analysis is not unjustified, it reflects an 
acceptance of men, in most instances, as undifferentiated and as largely privileged by 
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violence is necessarily rendered incomplete. Thus, while more particularity 
is clearly needed, so is an analysis that facilitates comparisons across 
categories. While Schneider does not provide a method for doing so, or for 
linking particularity and generality,195 insights gleaned from the 
intercategorical approach suggest that mapping the connections between 
particular intersectional experiences (like heterosexual and LGBTQ 
relationship violence, as well as victims and perpetrators) will be more 
successful than linking the particular to the general in the more 
individualized and unidimentional process typical of intracategorical 
approaches. 
C.  Theorizing from Particularity 
Crenshaw referred to the project of centering and illuminating the 
intersectional nature of subordination as “mapping the margins” of dominant 
discourse about race and gender.196 A more intercategorical approach to 
intersectionality involves revisiting the margins between social categories in 
order to map out the more complete, nuanced, and relational inquiry 
entailed. This remapping is facilitated by three significant shifts in the 
analytical structure of intersectional theory about domestic violence. 
First, expanding the intersectional frame is best achieved by shifting 
from the vertical to the horizontal aspect of particularity and generality. 
Because more particularity is needed for an intercategorical analysis of the 
performed intersectional experiences of all parties to a domestic violence 
case, the importance of a horizontal analysis—one that can also grasp the 
relative nature of privilege and subordination—is increased. Building 
generality from particularity horizontally, by identifying linkages between 
and within categories of difference (like victims and perpetrators and the 
many subcategories that comprise them), rather than vertically by linking 
more particular categories to more general categories, concepts, or issues, 
will help theorists avoid inadvertently circumscribing the analysis. As 
discussed above, generality should be the sum of relevant parts. A horizontal 
analysis, while not entirely eradicating the danger of siloed categories, will 
be more likely to result in a robust generality by moving through, and 
remaining grounded within, particularity. 
Second, an expanded intersectional frame is facilitated by a shift away 
from the intersections of subordinating categories to the relationships 
between the co-occurring intersectional identities of both the victim and the 
perpetrator. The cases of Sandra and Jerome and Madeline and Steve show 
 
the gender system.  
DOWD, supra note 77, at 13–14. 
 195.  See supra note 174. 
 196.  See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1241. 
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that each individual party to a domestic violence case is subject to not only 
one preexisting intersectional identity, but also to the stereotypes and norms 
applicable to their role in the case. These co-identities demonstrate another 
dimension of particularity and generality: each intersectional identity exists 
in relation not only to the general master categories giving rise to the 
intersectional metaphor (e.g., race, gender, sexuality, class, etc.), but the 
categories particular to the given circumstances (e.g., those pertaining to the 
perfect victim and the perceivable perpetrator), and their performance of 
those categories. Thus, Sandra and Madeline performed their identities in 
family court with reference to the intersections of race, gender, sexuality, 
and class pertaining to both the perfect victim and to them as individual 
women of color. Similarly, Jerome and Steve performed their identities in 
relation to the categories and expectations pertaining to perpetrators as well 
as those applicable to them as men of color more generally. In turn, each 
party’s relative success in the case depends on their performance (or, in the 
case of perpetrators, avoidance) of co-identity as well as the performance of 
the other party, significant witnesses, attorneys, and others. Figure 2 
illustrates the relational nature of co-identity between plaintiff and defendant 






 Third, this complexity of analysis requires a shift from the intersections 
of identity categories to the interstices created by the intersecting ideals, 
stereotypes, and norms constituting specific identities—in other words, to 
the relative positions of the identities of different subjects with respect to 
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those ideals, stereotypes, and norms. While a precise depiction of these 
relationships is probably impossible, Figure 3 offers a schematic rendering 
of the co-occurring and interdependent identities at issue in Sandra and 




 In Figure 3, each line within the two hexagons represents the ideal of a 
particular dimension of identity; distance from any particular line indicates 
the degree of removal from the ideal. Thus, the perfect victim is placed at 
the intersection of the identity structures that constitute her identity: she is 
white, middle-class, and heteronormative in her femininity. Sandra is close 
to middle-class and therefore situated fairly close to that line; phenotypically 
black and so distant from the white line; and does not present herself as a 
passive, docile woman, so also distant from the line indicating 
heteronormative femininity. In contrast, while Madeline has the same class 
position as Sandra, her performance of Latina identity arguably renders her 
somewhat closer to white, and also closer to heteronormative femininity. As 
for the men in these cases, Jerome closely matches the characteristics of the 
perceivable perpetrator, while Steve differs from the stereotype in some 
respects. The intersectional metaphor does not, by itself, capture these more 
relational qualities. However, intersectional theory does the work. By 
attending to the interstices of intersectionality rather than focusing on the 
intersection alone, we can better account for intercategorical and relational 
complexity. 
These shifts fit within trends in critical legal theory toward studying the 
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interconnectedness of forms of subordination—not only in relationships 
between structural identity categories, like those considered in intersectional 
analysis, but in connections between different manifestations of structural 
subordination, like violence by men against other men, state violence, and 
violence against women and within communities.197 For example, 
consideration of these connections informs a recent proposal by Angela 
Harris to consider moving from a constituency or issue-based approach to 
analyzing and addressing violence (e.g., violence against women or violence 
against LGBTQ communities) to a broader gendered-violence approach.198 
In keeping with the discussion above about the interrelationship of 
particularity and generality, Harris’s recommendation relies on a detailed 
understanding of various levels of particularity—e.g., men and the 
production of hegemonic masculinity, the victimization of women in 
heterosexual relationships, and the experiences of violence within LGBTQ 
communities.199 Moreover, her analysis relies on the relationships between 
these particular contexts and categories, which would be obscured by the 
circumscribing or siloing of categories that occurs absent a comparative, 
analytically horizontal approach. 
In addition to the foregoing, the analysis of the victim–perpetrator 
dichotomy operating in Sandra and Jerome and Madeline and Steve’s cases 
provides several other indications for what theorizing from particularity 
might look like. First, the analysis utilizes the insights of prior 
intracategorical work on intersectional identity from inside and outside the 
domestic violence literature. Thus, theorizing generality from particularity 
can proceed from either original research and analysis of a problem, or from 
the assemblage of the results of prior intra-or intercategorical efforts. 
Moreover, connections can and should be sought from across the spectrum 
of critical literatures.200 
 
 197.  See Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison 
Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 35–36 (2011) (describing recent developments in critical 
legal scholarship). See also DOWD, supra note 77, at 23 (noting the pressing challenge to connect 
fields of theory studying dominance, like feminism and masculinity theory).  
 198.  Harris, supra note 197, at 36 (“[Concluding] anti-violence theorizing and advocacy must 
take an integrated approach, understanding the interplay of race, sexuality, class, and gender and 
taking account of the places where, and the means by which, gender violence is perpetuated.”). Cf. 
Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 54, at 567 (“Although the development of a 
distinct legal construct concerning male battering of women has been theoretically important, and 
strategically necessary, moving to the more general level of violence between intimates and 
women’s subordination can illuminate theoretical and strategic issues that advance our work.”). 
 199.  See Harris, supra note 197, at 35–36 (drawing connections between violence against men 
in prison and the production of destructive masculinity, and violence against women and queer 
communities). 
 200.  See Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and 
Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of “Sexual Orientation,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1296–
97, 1330 (noting the importance of cross-jurisprudential and interdisciplinary approaches to tracing 
the interconnectivity of forms of subordination).  
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Second, while examining every dimension of master categories may be 
unnecessary (and prohibitive), examining all dimensions of the primary 
category at issue is usually essential to achieving an analysis that is 
sufficiently particular. Therefore, correctly identifying the dimensions most 
directly implicated by a given context for analysis is important. This also 
means care must still be taken in most cases to minimize the problem of 
inadvertently eliminating or circumscribing categories of difference. This 
can be done by making explicit the boundaries of the topic, the categories 
being considered, and the issues and categories that remain unaddressed.201 
In addition, the intracategorical approach may remain best suited for its 
original purpose—analyzing previously unexplored intersectional locations. 
Even in those cases, however, effort can be made to connect the significance 
of a newly analyzed category to other preexisting categories. 
A more particularized approach also has implications for practice. 
Based on her examination of the close connections between incarceration 
and other forms of violence, for example, Harris proposes looking outside 
the criminal justice system for solutions to gender violence.202 The case 
studies introduced in this Article show that the civil system may also be a 
site for the reproduction of racist and heteropatriarchal hierarchies in ways 
not previously understood. This underscores the need to rethink the function 
of the civil justice system in facilitating autonomy and safety for victims.203 
These problems cannot be addressed by thinking about victims alone and 
may in fact be intractable. Thus, the need for alternative approaches to 
gender violence is indicated by outcomes in the civil as well as the criminal 
justice system. 
Nonetheless, the need for more study is also indicated. Little is known 
about the role of identity in the civil justice system because demographic 
data about litigants in family law cases is not routinely tracked. Finding 
ways to collect data about litigants and outcomes in civil domestic violence 
cases while protecting the privacy of parties would facilitate quantitative, 
intercategorical research on outcomes and make it easier to learn more about 
the dimensions of the problem. In addition, qualitative approaches will 
remain important in order to capture the role of identity performance in case 
outcomes. To this end, “court watch” programs that train volunteers to 
observe court proceedings in order to evaluate the treatment of victims by 
judges and other court personnel should incorporate criteria for evaluating 
the performed identities of victims and perpetrators into their trainings. This 
 
 201.  See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 190, at 619 (“If the [domestic violence] literature described 
and theorized intimate violence in heterosexual relationships while explicitly stating its focus, far 
less damage would be done to the visibility and credibility of victims of same-sex intimate 
violence.”).  
 202.  Harris, supra note 197, at 38–39. 
 203.  See MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 32, at 118–22 (critiquing the 
characterization of civil courts as providing autonomy for victims). 
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type of data will be invaluable for determining what sorts of system reforms 
are needed to make courts more responsive to victims and to evaluate 
proposed alternatives. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A lawyer for a non-stereotypical victim like Sandra may assume that 
her client was successful because she was heard, believed, and taken 
seriously: the judge got it. Conventional intersectional analysis supports this 
interpretation. Considered together, however, Sandra and Madeline’s cases 
suggest that outcomes turn not only on decision-makers’ perceptions of 
victims, but also—or even primarily—on whether there is a perceivable 
perpetrator. Therefore, analysis of the victim in relation to the perfect victim 
trope is not sufficient to interpret outcomes or a reliable predictor of what 
will happen in future cases. Only examining the performed intersectionality 
of all the relevant parties to each case explains the structural dimensions of 
what may at first appear to be incongruously different results. 
The relationship of the perfect victim and the perceivable perpetrator 
demonstrates the importance of addressing manifestations of structural 
subordination with the interrelationship of subordinating categories, as well 
as relative privilege. As a method, intersectionality is especially well-suited 
to explore the relationship between the multi-dimensional aspects of power. 
Both intra-and intercategorical approaches to intersectional analysis locate 
individuals within a web of social structures that together form the more 
general manifestations of subordination. Adding perpetrators and the 
concept of performed intersectionality to the intersectional frame is an 
additional step toward a more comprehensive analysis of domestic violence 
that maintains categories as analytical constructs, but also facilitates 
identifying the connections between them in order to further a more broadly 
defined anti-subordination agenda. 
 
